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Participation, Power and Preferences in International Development 
 
Abstract 
 
Participatory development is widely touted as the remedy for ineffective and 
disempowering top-down development models of the past. However, participation can take 
many different forms, so an important open question for effective delivery of development 
assistance is: Which forms of participation influence which development outcomes under which 
circumstances? In this dissertation, I identify six key areas of research related to participatory 
development: the initial adoption of a participatory institution, the decision by individuals to 
participate or not, the direct outcomes of the participatory process, the effects on participants 
themselves, changes in the process over time, and carefully selected comparisons across 
contexts. I then make specific contributions to three of these areas through empirical research. 
 The first essay, Popular Participation, Reciprocity Norms and Conservation Incentives 
in Bolivia, examines the decision to participate. In it, I compare the characteristics of 
participants and non-participants in a compensation program for environmental conservation 
in Bolivia, and I show that in addition to material incentives, social embeddedness plays a role 
in motivating participation. The second essay, Poverty Targeting and Elite Capture in 
Participatory Planning in Indonesia, addresses the direct outcomes of participation. In it, I 
examine the geographical distribution of the outcomes of a participatory planning process in 
Indonesia, and I show that the benefits are captured most by the least poor areas, but that this 
occurs in ways distinct from how capture is typically conceived. The third essay, Gender 
Inequality and the Multi-Dimensionality of Power in Northern Kenya, addresses the effects of 
participation on the empowerment of participants themselves. In it, I assess the impact on 
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women’s empowerment of a program meant to enhance women’s political participation in 
northern Kenya, and I find that while the program largely fails to promote political 
participation, it has an impact on women’s empowerment within the household, very likely due 
to a component of the program which engaged directly with men.  
Overarching themes that emerge across these studies include (1) the importance of 
increased conceptual clarity not only with respect to the various forms that participation can 
take and the various goals it can be invoked to seek, but also regarding various hypothesized 
effects of and motivations for participation, (2) the potential relevance of the implementing 
agency and its relationship with pre-existing, overlapping social institutions, and (3) the 
usefulness of engaging with literature on psychology and behavioral economics. Understudied 
areas for future research include the evolution over time of a particular participatory process 
and more systematic comparisons of participatory processes across settings. 
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Introduction:  
Participation, Power and Preferences in International Development 
 
Leaders who… insist on imposing their decisions, do not organize the people— 
they manipulate them….they oppress. 
― Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed 
 
Promoting participation helps build ownership and enhances transparency and accountability,  
and in doing so enhances effectiveness of development projects and policies. 
― Worldbank.org 
 
 
Conventional wisdom among practitioners and donor agencies touts beneficiary 
participation in development interventions as both an end in itself and as a means to improved 
project outcomes. The World Bank alone has allocated several billion dollars to participatory 
development in recent years. Various streams of academic literature have attempted to address 
the effect of participation on development outcomes, but the results have been largely 
inconclusive. This is due in large part to a lack of clarity about what participation is and what it 
aims to achieve.  
 
What is participatory development? 
Indian parents are asked to monitor performance at their children’s schools. The post-
apartheid South African government asks women in impoverished townships to work as waste 
collectors for less than minimum wage. In Bolivia, rural villagers are required by law to 
participate in local-decision-making committees that propose development projects to the local 
government. What do these disparate processes spread across the world have in common? All 
have been labeled as examples of “participatory development.” 
Participation is more often defined by what it is not than by what exactly it is. 
Participation was conceived as a solution to the problems of top-down development models of 
the past, in which development agents decided how best to meet the needs of beneficiaries 
without directly consulting them. However, while often cited in contrast to this archetypal top-
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down model, participation is also not a wholly bottom-up process in which the resources are 
simply devolved directly to beneficiaries. While this latter model would directly address the 
same critiques of the top-down model that participation is meant to solve, in reality it still 
requires the agent to determine how best to distribute funds and to whom exactly. Since the 
agent lacks knowledge about the social structure, in reality this often reverts at least partially to 
a participatory model, in which development agents and beneficiaries must collaborate in some 
way to design, implement and/or sustain a development program.  
In the participatory model, both beneficiaries and agents are presumed to be engaged 
jointly, but the institutions governing that interaction can vary widely. The relative amount of 
control given to each party then can range from mere consultation of beneficiaries by agents 
who actually control the project to mere consultation of agents by beneficiaries who control 
most aspects of the project. Literature on participatory decision-making in democratic 
governance suggests that participation varies along at least three dimensions – who participates, 
how they decide, and how much authority those decisions have (Fung, 2006). In the broader 
sense that participation is used in international development, there are likely even more 
dimensions along which instances of it differ. The particular institutional form that participation 
takes depends in part on how those who design it understand the goals of participation.  
 
Effectiveness vs. Empowerment: Differing Models of Human Behavior 
Practitioners view participatory development as an improvement over the top-down 
model for several different reasons, and these policy motivations for participation are often 
divided according to whether they seek to improve the effectiveness of a given development 
intervention or to promote the empowerment of the participants themselves. Effectiveness 
arguments view participation as a way of solving a special kind of principal-agent problem that 
is prevalent in development aid, in which a development agent, not the principal (beneficiary), 
controls both the resources and the decisions over how to use them. Empowerment arguments, 
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on the other hand, concern themselves with a different kind of agency dilemma: the belief that 
failing to involve people in decisions that affect their lives is inherently disempowering.  
These motivations are not mutually exclusive, and in fact they likely seek similar long-
term goals. Both are ultimately consistent with Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach to 
development, in which the end goal is to increase people’s ability to direct the course of their 
own lives. However, the two views are based on different underlying models of human behavior, 
and a focus on one at the exclusion of the other has implications for both the form of 
participation to be adopted in practice and the design of research studies meant to assess its 
effects.  
Effectiveness motivations pose participation as a way to improve the efficiency of 
development projects by lowering costs and improving design and targeting. It is strongly 
informed by rational choice models of human behavior that tend to focus on material incentives 
and information asymmetries, rather than on more normatively charged (and qualitatively 
defined) concepts such as empowerment. As such, it is likely to inspire lower cost forms of 
participation, which involve beneficiaries sufficiently to transfer useful information to project 
managers and to share some of the costs of running the project. 
Empowerment motivations, on the other hand, present participation as an antidote to 
the paternalistic nature of top-down development, and as such, they seem to encourage high 
intensity forms of participation in which beneficiaries have considerable control over 
development projects. They tend to suggest more intense methods of communication and 
decision, more decision-making on the part of beneficiaries, and involvement at higher levels of 
institutional choice. Academic studies inspired by the empowerment justification are much 
more likely to be informed by sociological models of human behavior which focus on social 
relations and power dynamics, rather than solely on concrete material incentives. 
Further complicating matters, these differing understandings of participation, when held 
by local actors directly involved in the participatory process itself, affect not only affect what we 
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as scholars define as outcome variables, but are in fact themselves explanatory variables that 
will influence various empirical outcomes, through effects on both de jure institutional design 
and de facto participatory deliberations. 
 
Participation as a Dynamic Process 
A notable difference between rational choice and sociological models of human behavior 
is that the former takes preferences as fixed, whereas the latter allows for the possibility that 
preferences themselves are subject to change. A dynamic view that considers the evolution of 
participatory processes over time, and the goals of participation as understood by the 
participants themselves, offers a useful way to synthesize the two approaches.  
The preferences and beliefs of those who hold power at the outset will influence the form 
of participation that is adopted in the first place. The preferences and beliefs of the intended 
beneficiaries will determine whether or not they choose to participate in the process. However, 
the preferences and beliefs of all those involved have the potential to be changed through 
engagement with the process itself, potentially resulting in changes in the power dynamics 
between groups as well.  
In summary, participation is viewed as a potential solution to both the ineffectiveness 
and disempowering nature of top-down development, but stops short of a fully bottom-up 
approach by continuing to involve development agents in a joint process with beneficiaries. 
However, participation may take many different forms and the particular form most likely to be 
effective in theory and actually adopted in practice depends on contextual factors, including the 
particular preferences and beliefs of local actors involved in the process, as well as the social and 
power dynamics between them. In addition, these very same factors that influence participation 
are themselves subject to influence by participation over time. 
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Key Questions in the Study of Participation 
Because participation is a dynamic process, subject to evolution over time, questions 
about these preferences, understandings and power dynamics can be examined at discrete 
points in time during the different stages in a given process, but also through more long-term 
and holistic views that examine a given process over time and across settings. Below I outline 
the key sets of questions that studies on participation should seek to answer.  
Adoption of the Process: What conditions allow a particular participatory process to be 
adopted? Who played a role in designing and implementing the process? How did they 
understand the goals of the process? What are their own preferences and incentives with respect 
to the outcomes of the process? How are they related, via social structures and pre-existing 
power dynamics, with those who are intended to participate in and benefit from the process? 
How did these factors influence the particular form of participation that was adopted? 
Decision to Participate: Once a participatory process has been adopted, who actually 
participates in it and why? How do participants and non-participants differ? What are their 
preferences and beliefs with respect to the goals of the process? How do they think about 
tradeoffs between different potential uses of their time and resources? What barriers to entry do 
they face? What costs do they expect to incur through participation? What pre-existing social 
structures and inequalities exist that may influence individual desires and abilities to participate 
and be influential within that process?  
Direct Outcomes of the Process: What are the direct outcomes of the process with respect 
to the stated goals of those who implemented the process and those who are the expected 
beneficiaries of it? Does the process reflect/aggregate people’s preferences in a way that is 
representative, fair, equitable, and that contributes to the alleviation of poverty and the 
enhancement of capabilities? Who benefits from the outcomes produced by the process? Who 
bears the costs?  
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Indirect Effects on Participants: How are participants themselves (both development 
agents and intended beneficiaries) affected by their engagement with the process? Are 
participants ‘empowered’ through the process? Does participation change their preferences 
regarding outcomes of the process? Has their understanding of and relationship to the 
participatory process itself been altered? Has there been a shift in power relations between 
groups, and if so, do those who initially bore power take action to restore the status quo? 
Evolution over Time: How does the process itself change over time, in terms of both its 
formal structure and informal operations? Do participants wield any influence on the 
institutional form or the development agents who adopted it? Will the previous questions listed 
above yield different answers after several years of operation?  
Comparisons Across Contexts: Having assessed the effects, both positive and negative, of 
a given participatory process, how do they compare to similar programs conducted in different 
contexts? How do they compare to distinct programs conducted in similar contexts? Could a less 
intensive form of participation have yielded the same benefits? Would a more intensive form of 
participation have improved the outcomes? Which aspects of institutional design seem to 
correlate with which outcomes in which contexts? 
 
Contributions of this Dissertation 
In this dissertation I make three modest contributions to this literature, each of which 
addresses one of the key areas of research identified above, each in a distinct context. Such 
studies are most useful when considered in light of other similar research, and in each paper 
that follows I attempt to make some observations about how findings relate to previous studies. 
However, an important area for further research will be to more systematically codify and 
compare the existing body of research on participatory development. 
In the first essay, Popular Participation, Reciprocity Norms and Conservation 
Incentives in Bolivia, I look at the question of who participates and why. In particular, I ask 
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whether social norms, separate from material incentives, play a role in motivating participation. 
I look at this question in the context of a compensation program for environmental conservation 
in Bolivia. Compensation programs are typically presented as operating strictly through the 
provision of economic incentives and criticized for crowding out other motivations for 
conservation. This particular program featured in-kind compensations, framing meant to 
activate pre-existing social norms related to reciprocity, and implementation through pre-
existing participatory structures. The form of participation examined in this case is very minimal 
and more obviously related to rational choice arguments around cost-sharing and incentives 
than to notions of empowering participants through devolution of decision-making power. Thus, 
if it successfully engages with social motivations for participation, it seems quite likely that more 
intensive forms of participation would also. 
By examining household survey data collected prior to the introduction of the program, I 
compare participants and non-participants with respect to characteristics that are related to 
material/economic, environmental, and social motivations for participation. I find that while 
economic characteristics are certainly important predictors of participation, social 
embeddedness and the salience of social norms are also significant. One policy implication of 
this finding is that practitioners seeking to maximize participation in a program should consider 
pre-existing social institutions in their program design, but it also suggests that a decision to 
participate in a given program should not necessarily be interpreted as an indication that the 
program directly benefits everyone involved.  
In the second essay, Poverty Targeting and Elite Capture in Participatory Planning in 
Indonesia, I address questions regarding direct outcomes of the process. In particular, I ask 
whether program benefits are distributed in ways that (1) reflect the preferences of the 
population at large and (2) address the needs of the poorest members of the population. I look at 
this question in the context of a participatory planning process in Indonesia. Indonesia is home 
to another participatory planning process which has been cited for its success in targeting the 
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poor. This program, however, arose through different sources and is implemented at a different 
level of governance, and policy-makers have observed discrepancies that they believe are 
indicators of corruption in the process. If it is true that this process has been unsuccessful at 
targeting the poor, it provides an interesting comparison case for why different implementing 
agencies may lead to different results. 
By comparing the geographical distribution of benefits of the process with poverty rate 
data, I examine the degree of poverty targeting (or lack thereof) in this process. I find that not 
only is poverty targeting not occurring, but that, in fact, the least poor regions receive a 
significantly larger portion of the benefits – a potential indicator of elite capture. However, this 
capture occurs not through the discrepancies that had alerted policy-makers of potential issues 
with the process, but rather through a much more diffuse pattern of self-interested decision-
making. This implies that policies meant to reduce or prevent elite capture must be careful to 
consider various points of entry for such capture to occur.  
In the third and final essay, Gender Inequality and the Multi-dimensionality of Power in 
Northern Kenya, I address effects on participants’ themselves, and in particular I ask whether 
previously marginalized groups can be empowered through participation. I look at this question 
with respect to gender inequality in patriarchal societies in northern Kenya, where an NGO 
intervention introduced new spaces for participatory, community-level decision-making, and 
simultaneously made efforts to improve the ability of women to effectively engage in those 
spaces. These additional efforts included both training for women and a direct appeal to men. 
Given the highly patriarchal nature of these communities, as well as their overall 
impoverishment and isolation relative to the rest of Kenya, this presents an ideal “hard-case” 
within which to assess potential impacts on women’s empowerment. 
I examine pre- and post-intervention survey data in both a treatment and control group 
in order to assess the impact of the intervention on various dimensions of power, operating at 
distinct levels of governance. I find that while the intervention has mixed results with respect to 
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women’s empowerment at the government and community levels, there are several significant 
effects at the household level. Comparing these results with recent, similar studies suggests that 
the direct appeals to men may have driven the increases in women’s power. This implies that 
future interventions intending to empower marginalized groups may benefit from engaging not 
only with the marginalized group itself, but also with those who wield relatively more power.   
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1. The Decision to Participate: 
Popular Participation, Reciprocity Norms and Conservation Incentives in Bolivia 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the motivations that drive participation in an environmental 
conservation program in Bolivia. Programs that provide financial compensation to promote 
environmental conservation are often criticized because economic incentives may crowd out 
intrinsic motivations for conservation. Thus institutions that appeal to both economic and non-
material incentives are encouraged. The Acuerdos Reciprocos para el Agua (ARA) program in 
Bolivia attempted such a strategy, offering in-kind compensations for conservation activities but 
also making efforts to activate traditional social norms regarding reciprocity. This study seeks to 
examine whether motivations for participating in this program reflected purely financial 
calculations regarding the benefits of the program, or whether intrinsic motivations such as pro-
environment or pro-social beliefs and norms played a role in the decision to adopt the program. 
I take advantage of a comprehensive household survey conducted prior to the offer of the 
program and employ multiple regression analysis to compare those who choose to participate 
with those who do not. Findings suggest that the effort to engage with social motivations was 
successful, and that social factors, not financial incentives alone, drive participation in the 
program.  
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1.1 Compensation for Ecosystem Services as Social Institutions 
Understanding the different motivations that drive people to participate in conservation 
programs is useful to making those programs more successful. Direct compensations for 
ecosystem services, often in the form of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES), have been used 
across the world for over a decade to promote a variety of environmental behaviors (Landell-
Mills & Porras, 2002). However, the motivational characteristics and institutional aspects of 
such incentive schemes remain under-studied (Vatn, 2010; Muradian et al., 2010), and recently 
there has been renewed interest in the factors that influence participation in such schemes 
(Bremer et al., 2014).  
Increasingly, scholars suggest that these compensation programs are not comprised 
purely of market-based incentives, but rather must be viewed as institutions1 with significant 
social dimensions. Conceptualizing such incentives from a strictly rational choice perspective is 
subject to “commodity fetishism,” which obscures the social interactions that underscore 
economic transactions (Kosoy & Corbera, 2010). Compensation systems do not stand alone, but 
rather require interplay with multiple existing social and political institutions (Corbera et al., 
2009). A more practical conceptualization of these incentive structures would take into account 
power structures and social embeddedness (Muradian et al., 2010).  
Even the framing of programs as compensations rather than payments or incentives can 
influence their success (Wunder & Vargas, 2005; Vatn, 2010). Independent of intentional 
framing by policy-makers, perceptions of compensations can be influenced by pre-existing local 
discourse, leading one study to conclude that “PES should not be viewed as a market panacea 
transcending the local institutional context, but rather as a potentially complementary 
instrument within a broader rearrangement of environmental governance” (Van Hecken et al., 
2012).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1!Institutions are understood here in the sense popularized by Elinor Ostrom, as “shared concepts used by 
humans in repetitive situations organized by rules, norms and strategies” (2007).!
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Cranford and Mourato observe that, ironically, suggested improvements on PES in the 
literature, such as the use of in-kind compensations and a focus on cooperation and reciprocity 
(Farley & Costanza, 2010; Fisher et al., 2010; Muradian et al., 2010; van Noordwijk & Leimona, 
2010), reflect a return to elements of the community conservation schemes that PES was 
conceived as an improvement on (2011). After reviewing the pros and cons of each, they propose 
a two-stage approach that begins by creating a supportive institutional environment for 
conservation norms and then introduces more explicit financial incentives (Cranford & 
Mourato, 2011). Other scholars also propose hybrid approaches as a potential solution (Wunder, 
2006; Garcia-Amado, 2013). 
Fundación Natura Bolivia, an NGO based in Santa Cruz, Bolivia, introduced such a 
hybrid approach to incentive-based conservation. Its Acuerdos Recíprocos para el Agua 
program takes advantage of long-standing community norms regarding reciprocity and 
introduces a system of in-kind compensations for forest conservation and watershed protection. 
This study seeks to examine whether motivations for participating in this program reflect purely 
financial calculations or whether the effort to engage with social motivations was successful. The 
results suggest that social characteristics play some role in motivating participation in the 
program. 
 
1.2 Motivations for Conservation Behavior 
A common criticism of incentive-based conservation programs is that financial 
incentives may “crowd out” intrinsic motivations for conservation and thus be 
counterproductive in the long run.  Several studies provide evidence to support this belief 
(Cardenas et al., 2000; Jack, 2009; Velez et al., 2010; Kerr et al., 2012; Garcia-Amado et al., 
2013). In a recent review of 18 empirical studies on crowding effects of economic incentives for 
conservation, Rode et al. (2014) find that there is ample evidence of crowding out of instrinsic 
motivations, although in some cases “crowding in” may also occur. They classify intrinsic 
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motivations as either pro-nature (perceptions of the value of nature) or pro-social (referring to 
social norms, reciprocal obligations or altruism). They conclude that more concrete evidence 
about the circumstances under which crowding in or out may be expected to occur is inhibited 
by “a lack of appropriate baseline information about intrinsic motivations prior to policy 
intervention” (Rode et al., 2014). 
Relatedly, some scholars have attempted to examine the initial determinants of 
participation in compensation schemes. Many have observed that participants in compensation 
programs tend to be larger landowners (Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; Zbinden & Lee, 2005; Kollmair 
& Rasul, 2010). This may be both because those with smaller properties find it difficult to meet 
the requirements and because the incentive payments are lower and therefore less attractive to 
small landowners (Miranda et al., 2003; Pagiola et al., 2005; Bremer et al., 2010). Incentive 
programs typically require formal property title, which may also result in a skew toward 
wealthier and more educated participants (Landell-Mills & Porras, 2002; Wunder, 2008). A fear 
of land expropriation or a more general distrust of institutions is another factor that seems to 
influence the decision to participate in such programs (Miranda et al., 2003; Southgate & 
Wunder, 2009).  An econometric study meant to disentangle various determinants of 
participation in Costa Rica’s PES program found that there were three major influences: land 
size, household economic and demographic factors and access to information (Zbinden & Lee, 
2005).  
More recently, there has been a greater focus on non-tangible motivations for 
participation, mostly related to environmental attitudes or beliefs. In Mexico, researchers found 
that perspectives on the values and impact of forest conservation were critical drivers of 
participation in PES programs (Kosoy et al., 2008). A study in Ecuador found that motivations 
for enrolling in that nation’s SocioPáramo program included, in addition to access to alternative 
sources of income and low opportunity cost, the value that people placed on the watershed 
services provided by conservation (Bremer et al., 2014). However, these studies involved 
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interviews conducted after the decision to participate or not, which raises some concerns about 
survey bias.  
In addition, while some studies examine social capital as a potential outcome of forest 
conservation (Miranda et al., 2003), as a variable affecting its success (Cranford & Mourato, 
2011), or as one of the intrinsic motivations that may be crowded out by PES (Rode et al., 2014), 
fewer explicitly examine social norms as a motivation for participation in compensation 
schemes in the first place (Chen et al., 2012).  
The growing consensus that incentive schemes must be viewed through an institutional 
lens requires a closer examination of social motivations for participation, and whether the 
relative importance of different motivations vary depending on the institutional nature of the 
compensation scheme. 
This study attempts to distinguish between financial, social and environmental 
motivations for participation. It compares participants with non-participants using responses to 
a survey conducted prior to the decision to participate. Variables are identified which indicate 
how likely each person is to benefit financially (or incur costs) from the program, as well as how 
much they identify with various environmental and social norms, and how socially embedded 
they are in pre-existing institutions within the community.  
Participation in pre-existing social institutions may serve as an indicator of social 
motivations for three reasons: selection and socialization. First, people who choose to 
participate in other social institutions are likely already more community-minded than those 
who abstain from such social involvement. Second, through participating in such institutions, 
people may be socialized to act in accordance with norms of community-mindedness. 
In the research described in the rest of this paper, I ask whether participants in this 
compensation program differ significantly from non-participants with respect to each of these 
categories of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations for conservation. The goal of the research is to 
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assess whether the decision to participate is based purely on a rational cost-benefit calculation, 
or whether the program has successfully activated environmental and social norms. 
 
1.3 Setting 
Santa Cruz, Bolivia & Pre-existing Institutions 
During the 1990s, Bolivia introduced several laws that increased decentralization across 
various sectors. In 1994, the Ley de Participación Popular (Law of Popular Participation) set 
aside 20 percent of national tax revenue for distribution to municipal governments (weighted by 
population), and gave those municipalities new responsibilities relating to schooling, health 
facilities and water provision (Kohl, 2003; Pacheco, 2004). In 1996, a new Forestry Law and 
Agrarian Reform Law were also passed. In addition to changing market incentives to make 
unsustainable forestry less attractive, these laws also regularized land titling in rural areas and 
recognized the forest rights of private landholders’ and indigenous peoples (Pacheco, 2004). 
In addition to granting more power to municipalities, the Ley de Participation Popular 
(LPP) explicitly required grassroots participation in the planning process. It did so mostly 
through the creation of community-level organizations called organizaciones territoriales de 
base or OTBs, most of which were formed through the formalization of pre-existing community 
institutions. Through the LPP, the Bolivian government legitimized almost fifteen thousand of 
these local organizations and granted them responsibility to create community development 
plans and mobilize community members to contribute labor to public goods (Kohl, 2003). 
Particularly in rural areas, OTBs often represent intense social obligations to engage in 
communal work (Albó et al., 1989). 
It was through these community institutions that a local NGO, Fundación Natura Bolivia 
(Natura), offered its system of compensations for ecosystem services in five municipalities in 
Santa Cruz that belong to the Area Natural de Manejo Integrado (mixed-use natural area) Rio 
Grande – Valles Cruceños (ANMI RG-VC). Natura identified 130 rural communities within the 
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study area and randomly selected 65 of them in which to offer their compensations. The 
compensations contracts are called Acuerdos Recíprocos para el Agua (Reciprocal Agreements 
for Water) or ARAs, and the title is meant to evoke the informal institution of reciprocity norms 
that are common in many Bolivian communities (Capuma, 2007). 
A qualitative study of Fundación Natura’s previous attempt to implement ARAs in 
Florida Provice, Bolivia, reviewed the reciprocal labor sharing arrangements, minga and ayne, 
that are common throughout the region (Betrisey & Mager, 2014). According to their review, 
minga typically takes the form of a social event in which community members (usually men) 
come together to help one household with a large task, and in exchange that household usually 
provides, music, food and drinks. There is also an expectation that the minga host should 
participate when another community member calls his own minga. Ayne is slightly different in 
that it tends to involve a direct one-to-one interaction in which one community member offers 
assistance, with the expectation of help in return, though not necessarily of the same form 
(Betrisey & Mager, 2014). While these traditions are less common today, they have in some 
cases taken on new forms to retain relevance, and even where the institutions are no longer 
practiced, people cite their continued influence on community social dynamics. In interviews, 
farmers cited reciprocity as a key element in their decision to participate (Betrisey & Mager, 
2014). This study uses a comprehensive baseline survey to see whether quantitative evidence 
confirms these ex-post justifications. 
 
Acuerdos Recíprocos para el Agua 
The ARAs offered in the ANMI Rio Grande are similar to previous programs 
implemented by Fundación Natura Bolivia in that they provide in-kind, rather than monetary, 
compensations for conservation (Asquith et al., 2007) and use framing meant to highlight pre-
existing reciprocity norms (Betrisey & Mager, 2014). However, this was the first time they were 
able to offer the ARAs at this scale and also the first time they could collect a full baseline survey 
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of the beneficiaries prior to introducing the ARA contracts. This program also differs from 
previous versions of ARA in that it did not involve a direct one-to-one exchange between specific 
parties, but rather invoked reciprocity with respect to benefits received from the actions of other 
community members and from the environment itself. 
The communities included in Natura’s intervention are rural farming communities, 
where cattle are a common form of savings. The most abundant crop by far is maize, but on 
average households maintain between two and three different crops.  Sixty-seven percent of 
households own cattle, ranging from 1 to over 100. On average, households own about ten cows.  
Natura offers three types of contracts in the 65 OTBs in the treatment group. Level 1 and 
2 contracts are available for forested land within 100 meters on either side of the water source, 
which is considered the most high impact conservation area. Level 1 contracts pay more and 
have stricter requirements than Level 2. Level 1 contractholders agree not to deforest and also to 
remove cattle from the stream area. Level 2 is a provisional contract meant for those who are not 
able to immediately remove their cattle from the area. They agree not to deforest and receive a 
reduced rate while they incrementally remove cattle, at which point they will have the option to 
upgrade to a Level 1 contract. Those with land not within 100 meters of the water source are 
eligible for Level 3 contracts, which pay less than either Level 1 or 2. The terms are similar to 
Level 2 contracts – cattle are allowed but the number of cattle in the area under conservation 
must be gradually reduced. 
In all three cases, compensations are delivered in the form of goods meant to be used for 
conservation activities or conservation-neutral poverty alleviation. These include barbed wire 
and staples to prevent cattle from entering the water source, cement to harvest water or build 
shelter for the cattle, plastic tubing and water tanks for irrigation, corrugated iron for housing 
renovations, lawn seed for improving pasture land, and fruit tree seedlings and beekeeping 
equipment for income generating activities. 
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In each treated OTB, Natura visited the community 18 times in six rounds of three visits 
each. During each of the six rounds, technicians made a first visit in which they present the 
compensations in an informational meeting to the OTB. During the second visit, they give 
people the opportunity to sign contracts. During the third visit, they give the first set of 
compensations. This sequence of three visits was repeated six times in total, such that 
community members had six opportunities over the course of three years to participate in the 
program. This was done in part to alleviate fears of land expropriation on the part of some.   
 
1.4 Methodology and Data Sources 
This study compares those who participated in the ARA compensation scheme with 
those who did not, in an effort to see whether they differ significantly with respect to 
characteristics related to the material costs and benefits of the program, as well as with respect 
to indicators of intrinsic motivations for conservation, including pro-social and pro-
environment norms and beliefs. I first identify questions from Natura’s baseline survey that can 
serve as indicators for financial, social and environmental motivations, respectively. Next I 
compare contract-holders to non-contract-holders based on each of these variables individually 
using means tests as well as one-variable logit models. This tells me, on average, how 
participants differ from non-participants.  
Next I include the variables for all three motivational categories (financial, 
environmental and social) in a series of nested logit models in order to assess their relative 
impact on the decision to participate. If participants are primarily motivated by the material 
benefits of compensation, then variables related to the costs of compliance and size of 
compensation should be the most significant predictors of participation. However, if Natura has 
successfully activated social and environment-related norms (such as the traditional reciprocity 
norms described above) in motivating participation in the ARA scheme, then variables such as 
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belief in the value of the environment and social embeddedness should be significantly 
correlated with participation.  
Following prior literature on adoption of compensations discussed earlier, I include 
variables for the age and educational level of the household head, legal ownership of land, total 
land size, access to alternative income sources, debt, and distrust of institutions. I also add some 
variables on the pre-existing use of the land, and whether or not the land is difficult to access. In 
addition, I include variables relating to value placed on the environment, and on water in 
particular, and whether or not individuals associate the environment positively with financial 
motivations. Finally, I include variables relating to social embeddedness and the salience of 
social norms, including participation in the OTB, number of generations residing in the 
community, and perceptions of the community. (See Appendix 1.1 for a list of the survey 
questions used in the analysis related to each of the three categories of motivation.) 
Prior to implementing the ARAs in the Vallegrande region, Fundación Natura 
implemented a comprehensive household survey in all 130 villages identified within the region. 
This survey was intended to capture every household in the survey area. It included sections on 
household members and demographics, household assets and income generating activities, land 
use, institutional environment and environmental and social values and beliefs. Natura also 
conducted an additional village-level survey of the OTB leaders in each village, which asked 
about the existence of various organizations within the community as well as characteristics of 
the OTB itself. Of the original 130 villages surveyed, 65 were randomly selected to receive the 
ARA treatment, which involved six rounds of visits to each village.  
The list of contract-holders from the six rounds of meetings was then matched to the 
initial survey in order to assess how those who took up contracts differed from those who did 
not (within the 65 villages where the contracts were offered). In matching the contract database 
to the initial survey, some households appeared who had not been captured in the baseline 
survey. Follow-up interviews revealed that these missing households are a result of landowners 
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who no longer live in the village, often because they have moved to the city of Santa Cruz for 
work opportunities. These unmatched contracts represented 136 households, or about 25% of all 
contract-holding households. 
At my suggestion, Natura conducted a follow-up survey to understand why these 
households were not picked up in the original baseline. Many lived in the community only part-
time, or moved from one community in the survey area to another, or live in Santa Cruz with 
jobs in the city, but continue to own property back in the village. Because it is not possible to 
identify similar households who did not sign up for contracts, these households are dropped in 
the initial analysis so that we can compare only those who adopt ARAs with those who do not 
among people who were present at the time of the initial survey. However, a follow-up analysis 
did include them to reveal any relevant differences in outcomes. While the relative importance 
of financial vs. social motivations does seem to increase when these households are included 
(which is logical given the likelihood that they do not reside full-time in the community), the 
same social motivations are statistically significant regardless of whether they are included or 
not. (See Appendix 1.2 for the outcomes of this regression analysis.) 
 
1.5 Findings 
Descriptive statistics comparing participants (contract-holders) with non-participants 
reveals statistically significant differences between the two groups related to many of the 
financial characteristics cited in previous literature (Table 1.1). Contract-holders own more land 
on average and are more likely to own their own homes and have larger homes (indicators of 
wealth). They are more trusting of institutions. They also tend to own more cattle. This is 
particularly interesting because it indicates that the greater cost of complying with the contract 
due to cattle ownership is outweighed by the benefits of wealth that cattle ownership represents.   
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics Comparing Contract Holders with non-Contract Holders 
  No Contract Contract Holders   
# of HHs from original Baseline 888 407 
 
  
  mean se mean se 
p-
value   
Demographics of HH Head 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Age 50.03 0.59 50.26 0.70 0.82   
Education 4.69 0.12 4.90 0.17 0.33   
Wealth & Opportunity Cost 
 
      
 
  
Total Land 23.76 2.32 42.82 4.30 0.00 * 
Forested Land 3.88 0.59 6.35 1.30 0.05 * 
Pasture Land 18.79 2.31 31.88 3.35 0.00 * 
Cultivated Land 2.33 0.16 3.03 0.16 0.01 * 
% Own Livestock 0.58 0.02 0.87 0.02 0.00 * 
# of Cattle 8.65 0.55 15.26 0.82 0.00 * 
% Own Home 0.77 0.01 0.89 0.02 0.00 * 
# of Rooms 2.74 0.04 3.26 0.08 0.00 * 
Access to Alternative Income 0.63 0.02 0.67 0.02 0.16   
Loans 0.10 0.01 0.14 0.02 0.09  + 
Distrust of Institutions 0.04 0.03 -0.08 0.04 0.03 * 
Environmental Values & Beliefs   
 
  
 
  
Prioritizes Environment 0.39 0.02 0.44 0.02 0.07  + 
No perceived forest benefits 0.09 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.03 * 
Water Problematic 0.65 0.02 0.67 0.02 0.59   
Need to Harm Envt 1.44 0.04 1.36 0.05 0.23   
Better incomes 4.61 0.03 4.71 0.04 0.04 * 
Gov't Responsible 3.57 0.05 3.67 0.08 0.23   
Neighbors Envt 1.91 0.05 1.82 0.07 0.27   
Forest Better or Worse 1.76 0.03 1.76 0.04 0.92   
Conserve by No Chaquear 0.72 0.02 0.74 0.02 0.51   
Community Participation & Social Beliefs    
 
  
Comunidad_generaciones 1.98 0.03 2.29 0.05 0.00 * 
OTB membership 0.73 0.01 0.88 0.02 0.00 * 
OTB meeting attendance 0.94 0.04 1.31 0.06 0.00 * 
Community Work 0.52 0.02 0.73 0.02 0.00 * 
Frequency of Community Work  3.95 0.26 4.65 0.52 0.00 * 
Minga_ayni 0.36 0.02 0.49 0.02 0.00 * 
Gente_Coopera 3.67 0.05 3.93 0.07 0.00 * 
Gente_Ayuda 3.54 0.05 3.64 0.08 0.24   
Trabajar_Ganar 4.63 0.03 4.69 0.04 0.26   
Ganar_Compartir 2.84 0.06 2.77 0.08 0.46   
Contribute Equally to Problem 0.76 0.02 0.78 0.03 0.67   
Suffer equally from Problem 0.90 0.01 0.88 0.02 0.44   
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Contrary to some more recent studies of PES, however, in which participants cite 
environmental reasons in interviews regarding their motivations, there do not seem to be very 
significant differences between adopters and non-adopters with respect to environmental beliefs 
or values. One of the most significant difference between the groups in this category is related to 
whether or not the respondent associates improved environmental outcomes directly with 
improved incomes, which is arguably another indicator of financial incentives. On average, 
contract-holders are also slightly more likely to prioritize the environment over other values and 
slightly less likely to say that they perceive no benefits from the forest.  
There are also large differences between contractholders and non-contractholders with 
respect to their degree of participation in various community institutions, such as OTB 
membership, having participated in minga/ayni specifically or in general community work, and 
the number of generations a family has been in the community. With respect to beliefs about the 
community, the only question that indicates a difference between the two groups is when they 
were asked whether or not people in their community are likely to cooperate.  
When these categories of effects are included in a single regression model (Table 1.2), 
their relative importance becomes clearer. Some of the variables included in the table of 
descriptive statistics were not included in regression analyses. This was done either because the 
variable contained too much missing data to justify its inclusion in the model, or because the 
variable was deemed collinear with other variables in the table. The regressions included in 
Table 1.2 are logit models with otb-level fixed effects, where the outcome variable is binary, 
coded as 1 if the household took up at least one ARA contract and as 0 if the household did not 
participate at all in the compensation scheme. Model 1 looks at the impact only of variables 
related to a rational choice framework – variables meant to indicate the size of the financial 
incentive or of the costs to participation, as well as opportunity costs to participation, barriers to 
participation and beliefs that could influence the perceived benefits (distrust of institutions). 
Model 2 looks at the impact only of variables related to non-monetary incentives, such as 
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environmental and social values and beliefs and participation in other community level 
institutions. Model 3 combines all variables into one model in order to assess their relative 
importance.  
Financial characteristics are significant determinants of uptake, but I cannot confirm 
whether these operate primarily as motivations or simply as barriers to entry. The fact that 
indicators of wealth are correlated with greater likelihood of contract take-up even when 
controlling for things like land size (which would directly impact the size of the possible 
compensations), seems to imply that their significance has more to do with the absence of 
barriers to entry, rather than the presence of greater financial incentives for participation. The 
significance of percent pasture land also seems likely related to opportunity cost (as those with 
no pasture land at all are perhaps dependent on letting their cattle graze in forested areas. 
However, this is inconclusive without further data. What we can say for sure is only that those 
who choose to take-up the ARA contracts are more likely to have formal property rights, use 
more of their land for pasture, have larger homes, and are more likely to have land that is 
difficult to access and therefore can be conserved with little opportunity cost. 
When controlling for other factors, none of the variables relating to environmental 
values and beliefs seem to make much of a difference in determining contract take-up. However, 
the number of generations a household has been in the community is significant, as is whether 
or not the household identifies itself as a member of the OTB. OTB membership, in fact, has the 
largest coefficient of any variable included in the regression analysis. 
However, it is difficult to know how to interpret the impact of OTB membership. At first 
glance, this is not especially surprising. From a rational choice perspective, this could merely be 
attributed to the information that is transmitted through the OTB meetings. Because the 
informational meetings were conducted through the OTBs, it may simply be the case that those 
who are not OTB members are less likely to know that the contracts exist.  
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Table 1.2: Determinants of Contract Take-up 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Age -0.0101  -0.00708 
 (0.082)  (0.247) 
    
Education 0.0181  0.0101 
 (0.509)  (0.719) 
    
Total Land                                 0.000384  0.000330 
 (0.801)  (0.830) 
    
Percent Forested 0.527  0.404 
 (0.170)  (0.299) 
    
Percent Pasture Land 0.710**  0.648* 
 (0.006)  (0.013) 
    
Property Ownership 0.625**  0.691** 
 (0.005)  (0.002) 
    
Obstacles to Access 0.683**  0.583** 
 (0.001)  (0.006) 
    
Number of Rooms in Home                   0.251***  0.224*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
    
Number of Cattle                           0.0108  0.0107 
 (0.058)  (0.057) 
    
Alternative income                     -0.135  -0.201 
 (0.453)  (0.271) 
    
Debt                                  0.456  0.417 
 (0.063)  (0.096) 
    
Distrust of Institutions -0.0265  0.0528 
 (0.782)  (0.598) 
    
Environment = Incomes                                      0.0866 0.0421 
  (0.365) (0.679) 
    
Prioritizes Environment                          0.262 0.166 
  (0.077) (0.307) 
    
Views Water as Problem  -0.0532 -0.117 
  (0.748) (0.525) 
    
Generations in Community             0.209** 0.181* 
  (0.004) (0.021) 
    
OTB Membership                                 0.876*** 0.750** 
  (0.000) (0.002) 
    
People Cooperate                                         0.0674 0.0357 
  (0.183) (0.532) 
    
Constant -1.278 -2.402** -2.784* 
 (0.216) (0.006) (0.015) 
Observations 1099 1258 1089 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 1.3: Determinants of Take-up with Interaction Terms for OTB Characteristics 
 (1)  (2) 
Age -0.00577 Age -0.00654 
 (0.390)  (0.293) 
    
Education -0.0103 Education 0.0118 
 (0.744)  (0.677) 
    
Total Land                                 0.0000256 Total Land                                 0.000187 
 (0.986)  (0.901) 
    
Percent Forested 0.446 Percent Forested 0.470 
 (0.299)  (0.231) 
    
Percent Pasture Land 0.573* Percent Pasture Land 0.650* 
 (0.031)  (0.014) 
    
Property Ownership 0.694** Property Ownership 0.689** 
 (0.004)  (0.002) 
    
Obstacles to Access 0.564* Obstacles to Access 0.575** 
 (0.011)  (0.007) 
    
Number of Rooms                   0.236*** Number of Rooms                   0.225*** 
  In Home (0.000)   In Home (0.000) 
    
Number of Cattle                           0.0122* Number of Cattle                           0.0112* 
 (0.042)  (0.050) 
    
Alternative income                     -0.120 Alternative income                     -0.172 
 (0.546)  (0.347) 
    
Debt                                  0.598* Debt                                  0.383 
 (0.034)  (0.125) 
    
Distrust of 0.0541 Distrust of 0.0639 
  Institutions (0.617)   Institutions (0.524) 
    
Environment = Incomes                                     0.0737 Environment = Incomes                                     0.0352 
 (0.493)  (0.729) 
    
Prioritizes                       0.147 Prioritizes                       0.161 
  Environment (0.400)   Environment (0.323) 
    
Views Water as Problem -0.188 Views Water as Problem -0.104 
 (0.351)  (0.574) 
    
Generations in          0.154 Generations in          0.172* 
  Community (0.075)   Community (0.028) 
    
OTB Membership                                1.283*** OTB Membership                                0.138 
 (0.001)  (0.710) 
    
People Cooperate                                        0.0689 People Cooperate                                        0.0381 
 (0.268)  (0.508) 
    
OTB Mandatory 1.455 OTB uses Minga/Ayni -2.172 
 (0.234)  (0.071) 
    
OTBMembership* -0.549 OTBMembership* 1.148* 
  OTBMandatory (0.335)  OTB uses Minga/Ayni (0.021) 
Observations 953 Observations 1089 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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However, there are several reasons to think that the significance of the OTB variable 
indicates more than pure information effects. First, the nature of the intervention makes it 
unlikely that many of the non-adopters were simply unaware of the program. Technicians 
visited each community eighteen times over the course of three years and the compensations, 
being in-kind goods, are highly visible. Those living in the community full-time are likely to have 
heard about the compensations whether they attend OTB meetings or not. 
Secondly, the high number of ARA participants who live outside of the village indicates 
that word did indeed spread beyond those who were present at the informational meetings. 
Finally, the significance of the number of generations that a family has been in the community 
(even when controlling for OTB membership) indicates that social embeddedness, apart from 
pure information effects, plays a role in motivating adoption of the ARA contracts.  
In addition to awareness effects, there are two other reasons to believe that OTB 
participation might have an impact: selection and socialization. Selection refers to the possibility 
that OTB members are simply different ex ante from non-members. Socialization refers to 
persuasion occurring as a result of the fact that the information sessions highlighted the role of 
ayne, reciprocity, in these contracts. It could be that this framing of the program made 
reciprocity more salient for those who were present at the OTB meetings and/or that by being an 
active member of the OTB reciprocity norms are generally reinforced through social 
embeddedness.  
In order to seek preliminary evidence for these explanations, I include interaction terms 
between OTB participation by the household and two OTB-level variables: (i) OTB-level 
requirements to engage in community work through the OTB and (ii) the use of minga/ayne at 
the community level (Table 1.3). First, in some OTBs community work is considered mandatory, 
and there may even be fines or other forms of punishment for those who do not attend. While 
we still find that some people don’t attend even where it is considered mandatory, this would 
likely change the nature of who chooses to attend or not. However, the interaction between OTB 
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membership and whether or not participation is mandatory is not significant. This suggests that 
selection effects do not play a very large role in explaining the significance of the OTB variable. 
However, the interaction term for whether or not the traditional reciprocity institutions, 
minga or ayne, are used in a given community is significant and the coefficient is the large 
relative to others in the model. In those communities where minga or ayne is still used, the 
effect of OTB participation is larger. This indicates that the framing used in the informational 
meetings was more effective in those communities where reciprocity norms are still very active, 
and thus, a socialization mechanism is likely present. An individual’s exposure to social norms 
plays a role in determining their decision to participate in the ARA program. 
 
1.6 Discussion 
Social factors are strong determinants of participation in the ARA scheme. These include 
participation in the pre-existing participatory decision-making structure in the community, the 
OTB, as well as the length of time the family has resided in the village. Though the significance 
of OTB membership is likely due in part to information effects, additional evidence suggests that 
this does not explain the whole effect. 
The fact that the effect of OTB participation is stronger where there is a tradition of 
minga/ayne and weaker where there isn’t, seems to support the effect of the reciprocity 
framing. The fact that the effect of OTB participation is weaker where participation is mandatory 
and stronger where it is not provides some evidence for the notion that those who willingly 
choose to be active participants in the OTB differ in some way (perhaps community-
mindedness) that also makes them more likely to take up the ARA contracts. The strength of 
reciprocity norms in the community, as well as the individual household’s embeddedness in 
community institutions, seems to be important to determining take-up, though financial 
barriers to take-up are of course still prohibitive for many. 
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Results are suggestive of the fact that Fundación Natura’s ARA program is successful at 
reinforcing social norms at least with respect to participation in the program. It remains to be 
seen whether the importance of social motivations in take-up will translate to improvements in 
outcomes later on. It’s also not certain that the reinforcement of social motivations alongside the 
offer of economic compensation will necessarily lead to crowding out rather than in over the 
long-run. Finally, I cannot attribute these social motivations to specific aspects of the ARA’s 
institutional design in a way that is directly actionable in other contexts.  
Previous studies of motivations for participation in compensation schemes tended to 
focus on financial motivations (whether the size of the financial incentive, or the existence of 
financial impediments to participation) or environmental motivations. This study suggests that, 
like other forms of collective action at the community level, the existence of norms and 
perceived social obligations may be just as important. It is unclear to what extent the framing of 
ARAs as ayne, or the use of in-kind compensations, or the prior existence of cultural reciprocity 
norms each contributed to this. However, some safe conclusions to draw from this are that an 
awareness of existing cultural and political institutions in the design of compensation schemes 
seems wise and can aid in the activation of complementary intrinsic motivations. 
 
1.7 Areas for Future Research 
The fact that social motivations and reciprocity norms play a role in motivating 
participation in compensation programs for environmental conservation has several potential 
implications for the literature on long-term impact and crowding out of intrinsic motivations. 
Additional questions to be asked include: Do social motivations also result in higher rates of 
compliance with the contracts? When material compensations end, are those motivated by 
social norms less likely to experience crowding out? Does participation in the program itself 
have an impact on an individual’s social or environmental beliefs?   
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A next step in the research will be to examine data from the (currently ongoing) 
monitoring of those contracts that have been adopted. In partnership with Natura’s research 
team, I will look at the impact of these same characteristics (relating to financial, social and 
environmental motivations) on actual compliance with the requirements of the contracts. In 
addition, Fundación Natura has plans to implement a follow-up survey in all 130 communities 
in the region – both those where the contracts were offered and those where they were not. This 
will provide interesting opportunities to assess the overall impact of the compensation scheme 
on conservation activities, and it will also make it possible to test whether participation in the 
ARA program itself has an impact on social and environmental beliefs held by individuals. 
Although I did not find that environmental beliefs were a primary motivation for participation, 
it may still be the case that participation leads people to identify more strongly with 
conservation behaviors and/or reciprocity norms. Future research should ask whether 
successful activation of social norms in take-up will also translate to a strengthening of those 
same norms through participation. 
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2. Outcomes of the Process: 
Poverty Targeting and Elite Capture in Participatory Planning in Indonesia 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study asks to what extent a participatory planning process can avoid elite capture 
and engage in successful poverty targeting. Participatory planning very often occurs in two 
stages, and this paper examines such a process in Central Java, Indonesia, in which substantial 
divergence was observed between the outcomes of these two parts of the process. These 
divergences are often recognized as an indicator of elite capture, which works directly counter to 
an oft-stated goal of such participatory processes in the context of international development: 
improved poverty targeting. I combine data on the voting and budgeting outcomes of the 
participatory planning process with regional poverty rate data and use multiple regression 
analysis to test whether poverty rate is a predictor of the geographical targeting of participatory 
planning. Findings indicate that the process fails to target the poorest areas and may even 
conversely target the least poor. Results suggest that elite capture may be present, but not 
through the divergence between voting and budget allocations. Capture in this case appears to 
occur not through direct manipulation by a small group of governing elites, but rather through a 
more diffuse pattern of self-interested decision-making. 
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2.1 Participatory Processes, Poverty Targeting and Elite Capture 
Participatory institutions are increasingly popular in the context of both international 
development (Mansuri & Rao, 2004) and democratic governance (Fung and Wright, 2003).  
Community-driven development (CDD) has come to dominate development discourse, with the 
World Bank alone spending billions of dollars on its execution (Mansuri & Rao, 2004). 
Meanwhile, governments across the globe have adopted participatory planning processes 
(Goldfrank, 2012; Pateman, 2012; Sintomer et al., 2010), largely in an effort to replicate the 
success of participatory budgeting in Brazil but often without replicating its actual institutional 
form (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012).  
In Indonesia, both community-driven development sponsored by the World Bank and 
participatory planning in the government took root following the economic crisis and 
subsequent fall of the Suharto regime. Currently, these processes operate in parallel, but the 
World Bank’s program will soon be absorbed by the national government. The scholarly 
literature has paid much more attention to the World Bank’s participatory programs, but a 
better understanding of related processes within the government itself may help to anticipate 
problems associated with this transition.  
Participatory institutions are seen as a means to achieve myriad goals including 
improved sustainability, scalability, responsiveness, service delivery, and citizen capabilities 
(Mansuri & Rao, 2004; 2007). Often these various motivations are categorized as relating to 
efficiency (more effective matching of citizen preferences with policy outcomes and presumably, 
a resultant increase in well-being) and empowerment (enhancing the capacities and influence of 
otherwise marginalized groups) justifications for participation (Beard et al., 2008; Cleaver, 
2001). Arguably related to both of these broader categories of effects, participatory planning in 
the context of international development often has the stated goal of improving poverty 
targeting (Alderman, 2002) through the incorporation of local knowledge (Chambers, 1993; 
Ostrom, Lam & Lee, 1994; Uphoff, 1986; Narayan, 1998).  
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However, a common critique of participatory institutions is that they are prone to elite 
capture (Cooke & Kothari, 2001), which undermines both the empowerment and efficiency 
motivations, and also runs directly counter to the related goal of poverty targeting (Kumar, 
2002; Pan & Christiaensen, 2012; Park & Wang, 2010; Platteau, 2004). While poverty targeting 
implies that project benefits be disproportionately targeted to the neediest populations (a 
desirable outcome from the perspective of international development goals), elite capture 
results in the reverse: disproportionate targeting of groups who already wield power. 
Participatory planning is susceptible to elite capture, because citizens engaging with the 
process have differential access to the resources, influence and skills required to be effective 
within it (Abraham & Platteau, 2002; Fung & Wright, 2003). By some accounts, participatory 
institutions not only fail to alter existing power relations, but serve to preserve or even 
exacerbate them (Cleaver, 2001; Mosse, 1995). Scholars also note that over time, non-elites 
sometimes find their own ways to subvert elite capture (Classen et al., 2008; Long, 2001; Lund 
& Saito-Jensen, 2013; Saito-Jensen et al., 2010, Scott, 1985). Beard & Dasgupta (2007) suggest 
that collective action based on homogeneity lends itself to elite capture, whereas collective 
action based on “diversity, dispersed power and a dynamic social and political process” can 
effectively prohibit capture by elites.   
Previous literature suggests that the extent of elite capture is influenced by a variety of 
contextual factors, summarized by Pan & Christaensen (2012) as including “political factors 
such as the local power structure (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006) and levels of awareness 
(Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2000), economic factors such as income level and poverty (Galasso & 
Ravallion, 2005), sociological factors such as community homogeneity (Seabright, 1996) as well 
as program design features such the size of the program (Galasso & Ravallion, 2005), the official 
eligibility criteria and whether the program concerns the distribution of public or private goods 
(Araujo, Ferreira, Lanjouw & Ozler, 2008).” Fung and Wright (2003) suggest that the extent of 
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elite capture is influenced by the degree to which elites are over-represented, wield 
asymmetrical resources, information or influence, and/or have control over agenda-setting.  
Participatory planning typically occurs in two phases, both of which are potentially 
subject to elite capture, but few studies of elite capture examine the planning process as a whole. 
In this paper, I examine opportunities for elite capture throughout a participatory planning 
process. In particular, I examine the extent of capture in a participatory planning process in 
Surakarta, Indonesia, which partially mimics the form of the World Bank’s Urban Poverty 
Project, but is implemented through the national government’s Musrenbang consultative 
planning process. I combine information on the outcomes of the participatory planning process 
and the geographical location of those projects with poverty rate data to determine whether or 
not poverty is a significant predictor of targeting of funds through this process. I find that 
poverty targeting has not occurred, and so I ask at what point in the process did poverty 
targeting fail and was this a result of elite capture or something else?  
 
2.2 Conceptual Framework 
Both the measurement of and policy response to elite capture are complicated by the fact 
it takes multiple forms. First, elite capture can occur at multiple stages in a given participatory 
planning process. In addition, the involvement of elites need not result in capture, and capture 
may be perpetrated by various kinds of elites or even by groups not typically conceived of as 
elites. 
Participatory planning processes are typically characterized by the use of direct 
democracy to influence or determine government spending. A common form taken by 
participatory planning institutions involve an open vote process to propose potential projects 
and establish spending priorities (which I will refer to as “the public phase”), followed by actual 
spending allocations by a management committee (“the managerial phase”).  
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Elite capture may occur in either the managerial phase, with governing elites ignoring 
the outcomes of the public phase in favor of their own preferred projects (Fung & Wright, 2003; 
Gibson & Woolcock, 2008), or in the public phase, when those attending the meetings are not 
representative of the wider community (Shah, 2007). However, few studies take a 
comprehensive approach, examining opportunities for capture throughout all phases of the 
process.  
Recent research highlights the importance of a more holistic approach, by recognizing 
that capture is in fact somewhat fungible across phases of the process – when interventions 
target one phase, the elite capture may adapt and merely shift to another part of the process 
(Sheely, 2015). Thus an examination of the various opportunities for capture that are present 
throughout the process is useful both for developing effective policy responses to elite capture 
and for a deeper academic understanding of what exactly constitutes capture. 
Deviations between the managerial phase and public phase can occur in two ways, 
including “rejection,” where projects prioritized during the public phase do not actually receive 
funding in the managerial phase, and “insertion,” where projects receive funding in the 
managerial phase despite never having been proposed in the public phase. These each represent 
opportunities for managers to exercise control over the outcomes of the process in order to serve 
their own self-interest or the interest of groups that wield power over them. 
Table 2.1: Possible Deviations between Public & Managerial Phase Outcomes 
 
No Discrepancy Rejection Insertion 
Public Phase:  
Project was Proposed & Prioritized in a 
relatively open process  
Yes Yes No 
Managerial Phase:  
Project was allocated funding by the 
management committee when budget 
was implemented 
Yes No Yes 
 
However, not all deviations from public outcomes during the managerial phase are 
indications of elite capture. First, there may be legitimate practical reasons necessitating a 
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divergence from outcomes of the public process (Beard et al., 2008; Fung & Wright, 2001), 
which those in charge of the managerial process may then explain to participants (Gibson & 
Woolcock, 2008). More generally, elite dominance in a participatory process, whether based on 
technical justifications or not, may not always have negative consequences. 
Dasgupta & Beard (2007) draw a distinction between “elite control” and “elite capture”, 
suggesting that elite control of participatory processes need not translate into capture of the 
outcomes of those processes for their own benefit. In some contexts, elite control in fact results 
in outcomes that are desirable to the poor (Dasgupta & Beard, 2007; Fritzen, 2007). This could 
be because of true altruism on the part of elites or because elites benefit in some way from 
poverty targeting, perhaps through patronage or gratitude. In either case, this form of 
‘beneficial’ elite control may still be problematic from the perspective of empowerment in a 
broader sense (Fung & Wright, 2001), but it implies that elite control need not undermine 
effective poverty targeting and delivery of needed services to the poor.  
In addition, “capture” can occur by groups other than wealthy elites as we typically 
conceive of them. Elite power may derive from social, political or economic status (Dasgupta & 
Beard, 2007), and while these definitions of elites may often overlap, they need not. Even if 
those in charge of the managerial phase are not themselves elites, they may be subject to 
influence by narrow interest groups, which may include wealthy elites, but could also include 
civil society groups, the highly educated, etc. Elites can be conceived of as any group that wields 
disproportionate power, but this paper focuses on elite status based on wealth, because it is (1) 
easier to identify and (2) assumed to be correlated with other forms of power in this context. 
In addition, the goal of poverty targeting can be thwarted even without capture by 
narrow interests or small groups of elites as they are typically characterized. A form of 
“democratic capture” can occur whereby people vote along class interests or simply according to 
majoritarian preference rather than an informed understanding and careful consideration of 
where there is greatest need.  
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Gibson & Woolcock suggest that in participatory processes marginalized groups can 
engage in “deliberative contestation” to challenge capture by narrow interests (2008). According 
to democratic theory, deliberation involves “reason-based decision-making,” in which 
participants try to persuade each other of a course of action using reasons that appeal to others, 
such as fairness, group-mindedness or logic regarding effectiveness (Fung & Wright, 2003). 
Notably, the deliberative ideal does not require the absence of self-interest, but only that self-
interest be constrained by deliberation and that coercive power be absent (Mansbridge et al., 
2010). 
Table 2.2 below summarizes the potential combinations of capture (of benefits) and 
control (of the decision process) that could be observed in each of the two main phases of a 
participatory process. This is a summary of the existing literature as I understand it, and it will 
guide my analysis of the participatory planning process in Solo. 
Table 2.2: Control and Capture in Participatory Processes 
 
 No Capture 
(Reason-based decision-making) 
Capture 
(Pure Self-Interest) 
Elite Control 
Elites are disproportionately 
represented or influential but use 
reason-based decision-making that 
considers the needs of others 
Benevolent Oligarchy 
Elites are disproportionately 
represented or influential and make 
decisions purely based on their own 
self-interest 
Elite Capture 
No Elite Control 
 
Participants are representative of 
population at large, free from coercion 
and use reason-based decision-making 
Deliberative Democracy 
Participants are representative and not 
coerced, but use purely self-interested 
decision-making that ignores needs of 
marginalized groups 
Democratic Capture 
 
When some powerful group (in this case, the wealthy) are disproportionately 
represented or able to wield disproportionate influence over other participants in a decision-
process, I classify this as elite control (the top row in the figure). Only when elite control 
coincides with decision-making based on pure self-interest does it result in elite capture. When 
neither control nor capture are present, the participatory process takes on the ideal form of 
deliberative democracy as described in the democratic theory literature. The expectation in this 
case is that the distribution of benefits includes a consideration of fairness, and thus some 
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degree of targeting based on need (though this need not be the sole criteria and others may also 
receive some benefits). 
In both “Benevolent Oligarchy” and “Deliberative Democracy”, it is expected that there 
be some degree of poverty targeting, because the decision criteria considers fairness, equity and 
greatest need. In addition, if there is not much inequality in the population to begin with, then 
even with purely self-interested decision-making, there may not be “capture” in the sense of the 
benefits being directed to certain segments of the population. Similarly, the use of reason-based 
decision-making could still fail to result in poverty targeting if there is not much inequality. 
However, this is rarely the case in the context of international development, so I assume some 
degree of underlying inequality in the broader population.  
This table applies equally to the public phase and the managerial phase, but the same 
process could land in different quadrants in each of the two phases. The participants are 
different and subject to different degrees of control and capture. Another difference is that in the 
managerial process, the “reason-based decision-making” is more likely to involve reasons such 
as technical considerations, since the public phase has presumably already resolved the question 
of distribution.  
In the public phase of the process, a combination of representativeness and reason-based 
decision-making should result in a distribution of funds that is equitable and recognizes the 
neediest segments of the population (even if they are a minority). In the managerial phase, 
however, a combination of representativeness and reason-based decision-making will result in a 
reflection of whatever priorities were already established in the public phase.  
In the following pages I introduce a particular participatory process in Indonesia and 
then examine its placement in the conceptual framework described above. I assess the degree, 
form and placement of capture in the process. I ask: Are the benefits of the process outcomes 
subject to capture? If so, in which phase of the process does the capture occur? What form does 
that capture take?  
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2.3 Participatory Institutions in Indonesia 
The end of Suharto’s regime in 1998 marked the start of Indonesia’s Reformasi, a period 
of democratic reform that included a push toward rapid decentralization. Notably, laws 22/1999 
and 25/1999 granted local governments both decision-making autonomy and freedom to raise 
their own revenues (Antlov, 2003). However, the effectiveness of Reformasi policies were 
limited by the continued entrenchment of local elites, who had been mobilized by the Suharto 
government to facilitate state intervention in the lives of citizens (Antlov, 2003; Hadiz, 2003; 
Ryter, 2001; Sidel, 2004). This problem may have been mitigated somewhat in urban areas 
(Beard & Dasgupta, 2007).  
 Two participatory institutions were born during the Reformasi period: (1) the World 
Bank’s Kecamatan Development Program (KDP), along with its urban counterpart the Urban 
Poverty Project (UPP) and its modern variant, PNPM, and (2) Indonesia’s national Musrenbang 
process, a participatory planning institution that is embedded within the government’s formal 
budgeting process.         
The World Bank’s process, under its 
various names, is a very widely cited 
participatory program. It provides block 
grants to sub-units (kecamatans) in 
Indonesia, allowing this administrative unit 
to determine its spending. This process is in 
fact the example cited to support many of the 
purported benefits of participatory processes, 
and CDD in particular, described in the 
previous section. KDP is credited with 
enhancing the capacity of marginalized 
groups to challenge governing elites (Gibson & Woolcock, 2008), as well as improving conflict 
Figure 2.1: Indonesian Administrative Units 
 
National Government 
↓ 
Kabupaten 
(Regency) 
↓ 
Kota/Desa 
(City/Village) 
↓ 
Kecamatan 
(Province) 
↓ 
Kelurahan 
(Neighborhood) 
↓ 
RW 
↓ 
RT 
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resolution more generally (Barron et al., 2006). UPP’s poverty targeting is viewed as largely 
successful in spite of widespread elite control of the process (Dasgupta & Beard, 1997, Fritzen, 
2007). Less attention is paid to a parallel participatory process implemented by the Indonesian 
government itself.  
One result of Reformasi was the empowerment of cities to innovate with respect to local 
policy (Guggenheim, 2006; Raza et al., 2006). In the city of Surakarta (Solo) in Central Java, 
this resulted in the piloting of a participatory planning process that began in 2000 and was 
expanded to the whole city in 2001 (Solo Kota Kita, 2012).  
In 2004, the national government mandated that related Musrenbang process be 
implemented in every region of the country. The national Musrenbang (“Musyawarah 
Perencanaan Pembangunan” - public forum for development planning) is merely a non-binding 
consultation process that shares citizens’ preferences with policy-makers, but doesn’t mandate 
that policy-makers directly address those preferences in finalizing government agency budgets. 
As a result, the Musrenbang process exhibits very little impact on actual outcomes (Blair, 2010; 
Kristiansen et al., 2009) 
However, Solo’s Musrenbang  includes an additional component, called the Kelurahan 
Block Grant (DPK), through which a discretionary fund is devolved directly to the kelurahan 
sub-unit (which is the administrative unit just below the kecamatan – See Figure 2.1). Solo’s 
Kelurahan Grant (DPK) process functions similarly to KDP/UPP but is directly incorporated 
into the Musrenbang process that is part of the government’s formal budgeting procedure. In 
Solo, proposals for projects are collected at the RT and RW levels, and they are divided into five 
sectoral categories (Infrastructure, Economic, Governance, Social-Cultural and Operational). 
Elected representatives from each RW attend the Kelurahan-level Musrenbang process to 
prioritize those proposals. During this “public phase” of the process, the RW representatives are 
meant to prioritize the DPK projects according to a basic needs indicator as per the instructions 
of BAPPEDA, Indonesia’s planning agency.  
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About a year later, the DPK grant funding actually arrives, and at this point a DPK 
management committee (elected during the Kelurahan-level Musrenbang meeting the previous 
year) is in charge of allocating the funding to the previously prioritized projects. Those in charge 
of this “managerial phase” appear to have substantial discretion to make necessary changes to 
the list of priorities, but are expected to justify any changes in their DPK implementation report 
to BAPPEDA.   
Yayasan Kota Kita (YKK) is a local NGO dedicated to enhancing transparency in local 
government. According to NGO officials, the DPK process is characterized by rather large 
discrepancies between the outcomes of the public and managerial phases of the process. As a 
result of these discrepancies, understood by the NGO as evidence of corruption within the 
system, YKK partnered with BAPPEDA (the agency in charge of the DPK) to begin digitizing 
records of the DPK grant process as a way to enhance transparency and improve the functioning 
of the process. According to YKK officials, BAPPEDA had also begun to request stricter 
documentation starting in 2011, in response to the perceived high degree of managerial 
interference. The number of inserted projects being funded did decline after that, but they 
continue to account for a substantial percentage of executed projects.  
Indeed, an initial review of the newly digitized records reveals rather large discrepancies 
between outcomes of the public and managerial phases of the process. This takes the form both 
of rejection (projects that appear as “voted” in the public outcomes but fail to receive funding in 
the managerial phase) and insertion (projects that are funded by the management team despite 
not having appeared in that year’s public process). Over the full period of this study (2011-2014), 
only 40.27% of the executed projects listed on the DPK Implementation Plans appear among the 
lists of priorities that emerged from the Musrenbang –Kel discussions (See Table 2.3). With 
respect to actual dollar amounts, only about 57% of the final budget went to projects that had 
emerged from the formal consultation process. The implementation committee therefore has 
substantial power to make changes to the decisions made during the Musrenbang process. 
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Stats comparing outcomes of Public & Managerial Phases 
Year 
Total 
Voted 
Projects 
(Public 
Outcomes) 
Percent of 
Public 
Outcomes 
not funded 
(Rejected) 
Total 
Funded 
Projects 
(Managerial 
Outcomes) 
Percent of 
Managerial 
Outcomes 
from Public 
Phase 
Percent of 
Projects 
Inserted in 
Managerial 
Phase 
2011 838 81.03 333 47.75 52.25 
2012 767 78.36 289 57.44 42.56 
2013 903 77.85 304 65.79 34.21 
2014 860 78.60 261 70.50 29.50 
All Years 3368 78.95 1187 40.27 59.73 
 
Thus, the Kelurahan Grant process exhibits a very large degree of managerial 
interference. While it is unclear whether members of the management committee are 
necessarily wealthy elites, it is clear that the management committee has substantial discretion 
to make changes to the public prioritization. Even if the implementation committee itself is not 
stacked with elites, the more closed-off nature of the managerial process makes it more open to 
potential influence by narrower interest groups. However, this influence could potentially be 
wielded by civil society groups just as well as by wealthy elites, and as described earlier, the 
managerial interference revealed by these discrepancies need not result in elite capture – 
studies of the UPP showed that poverty targeting sometimes occurred despite elite control of the 
process.  
The goal of this study is to evaluate the degree of elite capture and/or poverty targeting 
in the DPK Kelurahan Grant process, which operates in the same setting as the UPP but with 
some distinct institutional features. 
 
2.4 Methodology and Data Sources 
This study examines the degree of poverty targeting or elite capture in the Kelurahan 
Grant Process. It posits that if poverty targeting has occurred, then the poverty rate should be a 
significant and positive predictor of the placement of funded projects. On the other hand, if elite 
capture has occurred, then income (for which I proxy using the inverse of the poverty rate here) 
should be a significant predictor of the location of funded projects. If neither elite capture nor 
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poverty targeting has occurred, then other factors should outweigh the poverty rate in 
determining the placement of projects. These questions were examined with respect to the 
outcomes of both the public phase and managerial phase of the process. 
The main source of data for this study is a digitized version of records from the 
Musrenbang process pertaining to the infrastructure category of the Kelurahan Grant process, 
from the years 2011-2014 for all 51 neighborhoods in Solo. Across the four years of this study, 
infrastructure accounted for, on average, between 23.4 and 36.4% of all DPK spending, and was 
in all four years either the first or (in only one case) the second largest spending category city-
wide. However, this varies significantly across kelurahans, with for example, two kelurahans not 
allocating any money at all to infrastructure in the year 2014. (Analyses were repeated excluding 
those kelurahans that spent less than 5% on infrastructure and this did not substantially alter 
the results.)  
In addition to the digitized DPK priority lists (outcomes of the public phase of the 
process), I also use digitized versions of the DPK implementation reports (outcomes of the 
managerial phase). This information was provided by the Indonesian planning agency 
(BAPPEDA) in charge of the process and then digitized by a local NGO, Yayasan Kota Kita 
(YKK), which is dedicated to improving transparency in government. I combine this data with 
RW-level data on poverty rate and number of households, which was previously collected by 
YKK in the year 2010.  
At my suggestion and under my guidance, YKK also collected a brief survey of 
Musrenbang participants (2 male and 2 female participants from each of the 51 neighborhoods 
in Solo), and conducted in-depth interviews with members of the management committee in six 
neighborhoods, selected to represent a stratified sample of kelurahans based on the percentage 
of discrepancies observed in the DPK process. This qualitative data was collected in early 2015.  
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Analysis of the quantitative data employs multiple regression analysis, and qualitative data is 
used to corroborate or clarify findings of the quantitative analysis. The quantitative analysis 
proceeds in three stages, corresponding to 3 distinct units of analysis made possible by the 
existing data.  
First, I assess the degree of capture in the geographical distribution of project outcomes. 
I examine the project location (RW) organized by poverty quintile as the unit of analysis (Table 
2.4). I aggregate voted and funded projects and their corresponding budgets to the RW-level 
(the administrative unit just below the kelurahan – Refer back to Figure 2.1). Projects that 
serviced the entire kelurahan were dropped from the analysis, as were projects for which the 
location was not recorded, as they provide no information regarding targeting. (These accounted 
for approximately 5% of projects in the database.) I then calculate de-meaned versions of the 
RW-level indicators (poverty rate and population) so that RWs can be compared to others in 
their own kelurahan (the site of the decision-making process). Because kelurahans do not have 
the same number of RWs, the RW-level analysis would be biased toward larger kelurahans. To 
correct for this, the analysis using location as unit of analysis was run after grouping RWs into 
poverty quintiles within their respective kelurahans. I regress the percentage of the planned 
budget (determined by the public process) and the executed budget (determined by the 
managerial process) on these RW-level indicators using kelurahan-level fixed effects. All 
regressions included kelurahan fixed effects. 
All RW characteristics are from the year 2010 (the year prior to the first year of data 
from the process outcomes) in order to mitigate concerns over reverse causality. In addition, I 
ran regressions using the change in RW characteristics from 2010 to 2012 as dependent 
variables with kelurahan grant spending in 2011 as explanatory variable. There was no 
statistically significant effect of DPK spending on the change in poverty rate (See Appendix 2.1).  
Next, using the full database of projects proposed and funded, I look for evidence that 
the discrepancies between the public and managerial phases are geographically biased and 
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correlated with poverty (Table 2.6). I run a logit regression assessing the determinants of 
funding (for the subset of “voted projects” that have been proposed and prioritized during the 
public phase) and the determinants of insertion (for the subset of “funded” projects that were 
reported as executed by the management committee). Also using the project as unit of analysis, I 
use linear regression to determine the actual budget allocations in these same two cases 
(funding conditional on voting and insertion conditional on funding). This project-level analysis 
allows me to assess the decision-making criteria used by the management committee, but 
doesn’t give me much information about how it compares to the decision-making in the public 
process (since it excludes those subunits that never received any project proposals at all). I also 
examine the in-depth interview data for reasons given by management committee members to 
explain the discrepancies between the public and managerial phases (Table 2.5). 
To further establish the existence or not of capture in the managerial process, I also 
aggregate the data to the kelurahan level, create indicators of both managerial interference and 
elite capture, and test them for correlation (Table 2.7). In order to measure the degree of 
managerial interference in each kelurahan, I created a statistic that represents the percentage of 
the final funding that was allocated to inserted projects – that is, projects that did not arise 
through the public process. This statistic demonstrates the degree to which changes have been 
made between the public and managerial processes. I also create a statistic to test for elite 
capture, that is, the degree to which project resources have been diverted to wealthier (or at the 
very least, less poor) areas. To do so, I created a statistic that represents the percentage of the 
executed budget in each kelurahan that is apportioned to RWs at or below the mean poverty rate 
within the kelurahan.  
Finally, I turn to a survey taken of Musrenbang participants in which their RW and RT of 
origin is recorded. I combine this information with the poverty rate information in order to gain 
a preliminary sense of how representative the process was of poorer regions. 
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2.5 Findings 
Capture of Benefits 
Using the RW poverty quintile as the unit of analysis, I find that the poverty rate quintile 
is inversely correlated with funding and this finding is statistically significant even when 
controlling for the percent of the population that lives within each quintile (Table 2.4). A lack of 
significance altogether would be enough to conclude that poverty targeting has not occurred, but 
the fact that poverty is significant in the opposite direction is suggestive of capture in some 
form. 
Table 2.4: Budget allocations by RW Poverty Rate Quintiles 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Percent of 
Voted 
Projects 
Percent of 
Voted Budget 
Percent of 
Funded 
Projects 
Percent of 
Actual Funding 
Percent Change 
Voted/Final 
Budget 
      
RW Poverty  -0.108* -0.174*** -0.151* -0.206*** -0.00695 
(by Quintile) (0.0485) (0.0439) (0.0650) (0.0600) (0.0100) 
      
Population 1.471*** 1.466*** 1.235** 1.022* -0.0461 
(% Kelurahan) (0.303) (0.292) (0.418) (0.448) (0.0685) 
      
YEAR -0.0182 0.162* 0.0149 0.0606 -0.00488 
 (0.0749) (0.0639) (0.0906) (0.0872) (0.0142) 
      
Constant 34.31 -329.6* -32.00 -123.3 9.656 
 (150.6) (128.5) (182.4) (175.4) (28.50) 
Observations 248 248 248 248 248 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The outcomes of the process not only do not target the poorest areas, but actually target 
the least poor areas. Across all 4 years and all 51 kelurahans, 12.57% of the budget was spent in 
RWs that belong to the least poor quintile in their respective kelurahans, compared with 6.66% 
spent in the poorest quintile. This indicates that there is indeed ‘capture’ in the distribution of 
project benefits. Because non-poor is not equivalent to being wealthy, I cannot conclude that 
there is elite capture occurring necessarily, but since poverty rate is significant even when 
controlling for population, this is also not merely a result of voter prioritizing broader impact 
over greatest need.  
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This is true of both the final outcomes as allocated by the management committee 
(columns 3 & 4) and the outcomes that resulted from the public phase (columns 1 & 2). 
However, the significance is absent with respect to the actual discrepancies between the two 
(column 5). This implies that the capture may have occurred in the public phase only, and that 
managerial outcomes merely reflect the decisions taken during the public phase. The large 
degree of managerial interference that has been observed in the process may in fact have been 
based on legitimate technical reasons (or at least not based on a desire to re-direct funding to 
wealthy elites).  
 
Table 2.5: Interviewees explain Discrepancies between Public & Managerial Processes 
Emergencies  
“Yes, there is a possibility where project might appear when there was 
emergency or force major. For example, when the Kelud Mountain erupted, 
there was some drainage clogged. The community decided to use DPK money 
to solve the problem. “ – Female, Kemlayan 
 
“[Inserted] project usually appear in DPK Budget Plan if there are urgent 
problem to be resolved such as natural disaster, epidemic of disease, etc  and 
it must be consulted to all Kelurahan stakeholders and approved by Bappeda 
and Setda” -Male, Sewu 
 
Alternate Sources of 
Funding 
“It is not ghost project actually, it just reallocation or readjustment project.  
For example, there was a case an RW proposed road improvement, later when 
the money come, we know that the road was no longer broken, so we re-
allocate the project or change the project, with acknowledgment from 
evaluation team and Bappeda.” –Male, Mansur 
 
“The level of voluntary in infrastructure projects in Kadipiro is still high, many 
infrastructure problems were solved by the community funding, rather than 
waiting for DPK or PNPM.” – Female, Kadipiro 
 
Technical Difficulties 
“We sometime have to cancel some projects due to technical or nontechnical 
problem. As I explained such as drainage under the house, where we have 
limitation to go into the house and make improvement.”  – Female, Kemlayan 
 
“There was an example of deleting project in Kadipiro in 2010, the making of 
… building… but when it was about to be built, the land status was questioned, 
and finally it was known that it belongs to individual. So the project cannot be 
proceeded.  But we have made the minutes of cancelation and reported to 
Bappeda.” -Female, Kadipiro 
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Phase of the Process 
In qualitative interviews, members of the management committee provided several 
plausible explanations for discrepancies between the Public and Managerial phases of the 
process (Table 2.5). While I cannot directly corroborate any of these explanations with the 
current data, regression analysis at least does not directly contradict any of these explanations. 
Indeed, the project-level regressions seem to support this as well (Table 2.6). They 
demonstrate that the key determinants of whether or not a voted project receives funding from 
the management committee are: how highly it was prioritized in the public phase of the process, 
and what kind of project it is (with preference given to both drainage and roads projects, which 
make up the largest percentage of the proposed projects to begin with). RW characteristics such 
as the poverty rate and population have no statistically significant effect.  
The only significant predictor of insertion in this model is the year of execution. The 
decrease in insertion over time may be due to BAPPEDA’s stricter reporting requirements.  So, 
while there is no evidence of elite capture in the managerial phase of the process for the years 
covered by this data, it is possible that capture used to occur in the managerial phase and moved 
to the public phase in response to stricter reporting guidelines. However, the significance of the 
year may also reflect, for example, fewer emergency situations occurring over time as 
infrastructure generally improves. I do not have access to previous years’ records nor to data on 
natural disasters in order to distinguish between these explanations, but that could be an 
interesting area for future research. 
Finally, when I examine the relationship between managerial interference and elite 
capture at the kelurahan level, I find that there is in fact an inverse relationship between the 
two. In kelurahans where the management committee interferes more, there is actually less elite 
capture, on average. This provides fairly strong evidence that there is no elite capture occurring 
in the managerial phase during the years studied here.  
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Table 2.6: Project-level determinants of Execution and Budget allocations 
 Voted Projects: Executed Projects: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Is it funded? Executed Budget Inserted 
project? 
Executed Budget 
     
Priority -0.0188*** -35655.1**   
 (0.00383) (11958.7)   
     
Proposed Budget -7.68e-10 -0.0000739   
 (1.37e-09) (0.0000449)   
     
Drainage Project 0.662*** -749154.2 -0.150 6640171.2 
 (0.145) (1272398.0) (0.234) (9449250.7) 
     
Road Project 0.557*** 892918.6 0.0943 7242339.4 
 (0.151) (1358068.0) (0.258) (6795082.8) 
     
YEAR 0.0120 -92030.4 -0.568*** 1240945.5 
 (0.0497) (201056.0) (0.0792) (1309756.7) 
     
RW Poverty -0.0248 115985.8 0.0375 175262.0 
 (0.0421) (364858.6) (0.0651) (1141193.7) 
     
RW Private WCs 0.000847 1400.2 0.00213 -138211.2 
 (0.00395) (23113.8) (0.00595) (130301.5) 
     
RW Population 0.221 -114225.1 2.477 13913782.1 
 (1.817) (15958667.1) (3.132) (54943719.1) 
     
Constant -25.35 185870346.1 1141.7*** -2.47517e+09 
 (100.1) (404757640.3) (159.2) (2.63402e+09) 
Observations 2645 2830 909 1011 
Model Type Logit OLS Logit OLS 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Table 2.7: Relationship between  
Elite Capture & Managerial Interference across Kelurahans 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Managerial  -0.460* -0.448* -0.455* 
Interference (0.198) (0.200) (0.201) 
    
Year  0.0304 0.0337 
  (0.0721) (0.0723) 
    
Infrastructure   -0.700 
Spending   (0.520) 
    
Constant 0.152 -61.11 -67.58 
 (0.111) (145.2) (145.6) 
Observations 183 183 183 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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While I don’t have direct evidence on the wealth of members of the management 
committee, it seems likely that they are ‘elite’ in some regard – in the sense that they serve as 
leaders within this process. I consider it highly likely that “benevolent oligarchy” is occurring in 
the management phase (though I cannot rule out “deliberative democracy”). The quantitative 
analysis is consistent with relatively benign elite control: governing elites on the management 
committee do interfere with outcomes but not necessarily in ways that benefit the wealthy or 
directly interfere with poverty targeting. Of course, it is still possible that benefits are somehow 
captured by other types of elite status which do not correlate with wealth. Still, I find no 
evidence that discrepancies introduced by the managerial process are based on something other 
than legitimate technical considerations.  
 
Capture by Whom? 
It seems clear that capture is occurring during the public phase of the process, but that 
still leaves the question of who, exactly, is doing the capturing. It’s important to note that 
poverty rate is a perfectly appropriate indicator for assessing the extent of poverty targeting, but 
its inverse is only a very rough proxy for wealth or the existence of elites. What regression 
analyses thus far have shown for sure is that benefits are captured by the non-poor.  
Returning to Table 2.4, the high significance of population in determining the 
geographical distribution of projects could be consistent with self-interested but representative 
voting (democratic capture). However, the fact that poverty quintile is significant even when 
controlling for population suggests that perhaps some degree of elite capture is also present. It is 
not simply the case that the poorest areas are also the least populated. 
In the survey of participants conducted by YKK, income data was not collected. However, 
respondents were asked to name the RT and RW where they live. According to the rules of the 
process, there must be a representative from each RW, so it is safe to assume that the RWs are 
evenly represented by poverty quintile. However, the survey data indicates that within each 
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respondent’s RW, they were more likely to come from one of the least poor RTs in their 
respective RWs. Out of 192 respondents who shared their location, 31.25% came from an RT in 
the least poor quintile in their RW. Only 7.81% came from the poorest quintile in their RW.  
I cannot guarantee that the survey respondents are perfectly representative of the 
Musrenbang participants more generally, because an opportunistic rather than random 
sampling strategy was used. (Surveyors simply went to meetings to see who was available to be 
surveyed.) However, bias introduced by the sampling method is likely to skew toward the more 
active participants in the process. Thus it may indicate disproportionate influence if not 
disproportionate representation in the process. However, once again it is important to note that 
a low poverty rate only tells us that there are higher numbers of non-poor, not necessarily 
wealthy elites. Thus it is not clear whether this is a case of wealthy elites manipulating the 
process for their own benefit, or rather a non-poor, non-elite majority voting along class lines. I 
cannot conclusively distinguish between elite capture and democratic capture in this context. 
 
2.6 Discussion 
Despite a high degree of interference by the management committee, I find no evidence 
of capture during the managerial phase of the DPK process. In fact, there is some preliminary 
evidence suggestive of managerial interference mitigating the degree of capture in the results of 
the public phase. In the public phase, it is clear that poverty targeting is absent and that benefits 
are captured by a non-poor group. It also appears that there are lower levels of participation on 
the part of the poorest. 
In the public phase, the ability to submit proposals is, at least theoretically, open to the 
entire public, and the Musrenbang participants are explicitly mandated to be representative of 
all RWs within each kelurahan. Bearing this in mind, it seems that this is not an example of elite 
capture as typically conceived – a small group of elites making decisions behind closed doors – 
but rather something more diffuse.  
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I see three possible sources of this capture: (1) wealthy elites in various parts of a 
kelurahan use their power to explicitly limit the participation of the poor in order to wield 
greater influence themselves, (2) a non-poor, non-elite majority votes according to self-interest, 
resulting in fewer benefits delivered to the poor, and the poor exit the process as a result, or (3) 
the poor, having limited resources and time, choose not to participate in this process and engage 
in deliberative contestation because other investments of their time yield higher perceived 
returns compared with the lengthy, bureaucratic nature of this process. 
These findings may be relevant to scholars studying social structures in Indonesia. 
Explanation 1 is consistent with Sidel’s description of elites in Indonesia as a “decidedly looser, 
more nebulous and less monolithic pattern of local networks, ‘mafias’ and ‘clans,’” and 
explanations 2 and 3 are consistent with his characterization of Indonesian culture as featuring 
“strong community, class, ethnic and religious identities” (2004). 
The results of this study also contribute to prior literature problematizing our 
understanding of elite capture. It confirms Dasgupta and Beard’s findings that (1) elite control 
does not always result in elite capture of benefits, and that (2) public, “democratic” processes 
can in fact result in worse poverty targeting than those characterized by elite control (2007). 
However, whereas Dasgupta and Beard find that the World Bank’s UPP is generally successful at 
targeting the poor despite elite control, I find that the DPK is mostly unsuccessful at targeting 
the poor and is subject to capture, despite no obvious control of the process by wealthy elites. 
Because the UPP’s modern successor (PNPM) and the DPK operate simultaneously in the same 
context, this raises several questions for possible future research. 
 
2.7 Areas for Further Research 
The fact that PNPM and DPK operate simultaneously in the same context provides an 
interesting opportunity for direct comparison between outcomes of the two in the same places 
over the same years. Because PNPM has a shorter time horizon between proposal and funding, 
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the poor may choose to submit proposals there instead of to the Kelurahan Grant, thus allowing 
the non-poor to capture the benefits of the Kelurahan Grant. With data from the PNPM process 
over the same time horizon, it would be possible to test for this crowding out.  
If the lack of poverty targeting in DPK is directly correlated with successful poverty 
targeting in PNPM, this raises some questions about the implications of continuing to run two 
parallel participatory processes, one of which is embedded in the bureaucratic machinery of the 
government, and one of which circumvents it. If the outcomes of the two processes are not 
related in that way, then it is worth studying which institutional design factors help account for 
the difference in targeting outcomes between the two.  
Some other areas for future research arise from the limitations of this study. For 
example, only the DPK data on infrastructure was available at the time of analysis. Kelurahan 
level regressions included a control for the proportion of the budget spent on infrastructure, and 
lower level regressions were repeated after excluding those kelurahans with very low levels of 
infrastructure spending, with no impact on the key results. That said, a future study should seek 
to obtain digital records of the full DPK records system and repeat this analysis to find out 
whether the patterns witnessed here are similar across all categories of spending or if capture is 
more or less likely depending on the type of outcomes in question. 
In addition, my findings addressed the degree of capture and poverty targeting across 
the entire process. However, this analysis obscures substantial variation across kelurahans. If I 
examine the degree of managerial control (conceptualized as the percentage of the executed 
budget that went to projects not suggested by the public process) and the degree of elite capture 
(conceptualized as the percentage of the executed budget that went to RWs at or below the mean 
poverty rate in their kelurahans), I find substantial variation across kelurahans on both 
measures. The degree of managerial control varies from 0 in Kedung Lumbu to 1 in Kratonan. 
The degree of elite capture (which could also be described as a failure to target the poor) varies 
from 0 in Sudiroprajan to 0.8 in Kepatihan Kulon. Future research should seek to combine this 
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data with statistics regarding kelurahan level characteristics to see what factors predict the 
degree of elite control and elite capture, and how these interact with each other across the study 
area.  
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3. Effects on Participants: 
Gender Inequality and the Multi-dimensionality of Power in Northern Kenya 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study evaluates the impact on women’s empowerment of interventions intended to 
increase women’s participation in governance. It assesses the impact of an NGO intervention in 
northern Kenya’s pastoralist communities, which aimed to increase women’s political 
participation, but was implemented through an existing financial empowerment program. It 
asks whether this intervention successfully brings about women’s empowerment (understood as 
a process by which power is increased). I first discuss a conceptual framework that identifies 
various dimensions of power. I then take advantage of a pre- and post-intervention survey 
conducted in both a treatment and control group, and I employ a difference-in-difference 
analysis to assess the impact of the intervention on different dimensions of power. Although the 
intervention was designed primarily with women’s political participation in the community and 
government in mind, most of the results are concentrated at the household level. While women’s 
participation in community-level decision-making increases, it is not necessarily influential or 
effective. Understood in the context of previous research on women’s empowerment, results 
suggest several areas for future research, such as evaluating the importance of engaging with 
those already in power when attempting to give voice to marginalized groups, and testing for 
dynamic interactions between different dimensions and scales of empowerment. 
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3.1 Introduction  
Gender inequality remains a major challenge throughout the world. While much 
progress has been made, gender gaps are particularly persistent in contexts where they coincide 
with poverty and other forms of marginalization (World Bank, 2012). As a result, there has been 
significant interest recently in the empirical relationship between women’s economic and 
political empowerment (Duflo, 2012).  
Empowerment occurs when power is increased, and political theorists have long 
acknowledged that power itself is multi-dimensional in nature (Lukes, 1974). Yet empirical 
studies on empowerment rarely engage directly with this conceptual literature on power. 
Implicitly, however, empiricists acknowledge that empowerment comes in different forms and 
have begun to assess their relationship to each other. A review of studies on the relationship 
between women’s economic and political empowerment suggests that more comprehensive 
policies are necessary, addressing multiple aspects of power simultaneously (Duflo, 2012).  
This study examines such an intervention. An NGO that had already provided business 
training for women decided to implement a complementary program focusing on women’s 
political empowerment. The NGO hoped that it would succeed where others had failed because 
it combined multiple efforts intended to address different dimensions of power. In addition, 
NGO staff believed that its prior economic empowerment work might have left women already 
more well-prepared to benefit from additional programming, and that by engaging directly with 
men in addition to women, it would avoid any potential backlash that could arise from 
challenging the status quo.  
Results confirm previous findings that in a context of extreme inequality, short-term 
interventions are unlikely to yield major gains with respect to government involvement. 
Although the intervention was designed primarily with women’s political participation in the 
community and government in mind, most of the results are concentrated at the household 
level. The present study cannot definitively distinguish among various causal mechanisms that 
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could explain these results, but taken in light of previous research, they indicate the importance 
of engaging with those already in power when attempting to give voice to marginalized groups, 
and testing for dynamic interactions between different dimensions and scales of empowerment. 
 
3.2 Gender Inequality  
Political participation is one observable indicator of political empowerment. The gender 
gap in civic and political participation has been well documented (Verba et al., 1993), and it is 
particularly large in Africa (Isaksson et al., 2014). Since gender gaps are particularly pervasive in 
contexts of extreme poverty (World Bank, 2012), women’s economic and political 
marginalization are viewed as potentially reinforcing one another. As a result, there has recently 
been significant interest in the relationship between women’s economic and political 
empowerment, with much of this literature focusing on whether increasing economic 
development leads automatically to increases in political power for women, or vice versa. For 
example, increased access to decision-making spaces for women may result in policies that in 
turn enhance economic outcomes. On the other hand, increased economic power for women 
may increase their status in society or give them access to the necessary resources to make them 
more able to gain access to decision-making spaces.  
A significant amount of research has been conducted on women’s political participation 
in India, where the literature suggests that the gender of politicians does in fact change policy 
outcomes (Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004; Clots-Figueras, 2011; 2012) indicating one 
mechanism through which political empowerment is likely to influence other dimensions of 
power. Both men and women are less likely to report satisfaction with female leaders (Duflo & 
Topalova, 2004), and it is gender-based prejudice, rather than actual performance, which drives 
these lower levels of satisfaction (Beaman et al., 2009). Bias against women leaders is also 
corroborated by laboratory experiments (Eagly & Karau, 2002). This is further confirmed by the 
fact that increased exposure to female leaders has the long-term effect of overturning these false 
57 
!
beliefs about women’s competence and of increasing acceptance of female politicians (Bhavnani, 
2009).  
In Africa, increases in female leadership were also associated with an increase in other 
forms of political participation by women (Barnes & Burchard, 2013). However, in highly 
patriarchal cultures and in the absence of formal quotas, discriminatory gender norms have 
been difficult to overturn. A program that increased gender representation in community-level 
decision-making Afghanistan did increase political participation and even incomes, but failed to 
influence intra-family decision-making or societal attitudes toward women (Beath et al., 2013). 
Business training benefited Hindu women of all castes, but not Muslim women who face higher 
social restrictions (Field et al., 2010). In Mali, an increase in civic education was insufficient to 
overcome a gender gap in political participation and may have exacerbated it (Gottlieb, 2014).  
Duflo (2012) reviews the literature on economic and political empowerment and 
concludes that neither is sufficient to initiate the other.  She concludes that more comprehensive 
policies are necessary that address both economic and political dimensions of empowerment 
simultaneously. Political empowerment does not immediately trickle down to improve intra-
household distribution of resources, nor does financial empowerment automatically trickle up to 
increase numbers of women taking on political leadership roles. But it is perhaps true that 
economic empowerment leaves women more well-prepared to take advantage of opportunities 
for political empowerment when they arise, or vice-versa.  
While political theorists have long acknowledged the multi-dimensional nature of power 
and empowerment, empirical studies of empowerment have more often focused on monolithic 
interventions intended to influence one particular aspect of power. More recently, there has 
been a surge of interest in the effect of women’s economic empowerment on political 
empowerment (and vice versa) in contexts of extreme gender inequality. Prior research 
demonstrates that interventions geared at one form of exclusion without heeding gender 
differences can have the unintended consequence of increasing gender inequality (Gottlieb, 
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2014). Meanwhile, interventions that focus on gender empowerment in one sphere are typically 
insufficient to spur gains in other areas (Beath et al., 2013; Duflo, 2012).  
However, less attention has been paid to interactions between different dimensions of 
empowerment. Few studies acknowledge all dimensions of power, and few examine 
interventions which target multiple dimensions of empowerment at once.  
 
3.3 Conceptual Framework: The Multi-Dimensionality of Power 
I understand power as analogous to Sen’s capabilities: individuals’ abilities to direct their 
own lives (1999). If power is understood as this ability, then empowerment is a process by which 
that ability is expanded. Kabeer defines empowerment as “the process by which those who have 
been denied the ability to make strategic life choices acquire such an ability” (1999). 
An empirical evaluation of empowerment in practice (i.e. assessing whether or not an 
individual’s power has increased) is complicated by several factors: (1) Power itself is 
multidimensional; (2) Power can be exercised at multiple levels of governance; (3) Power itself 
is not observable, but uses of it are; and (4) Power has both relational and absolute components. 
 
Dimensions of Power 
A long-standing tradition in political theory suggests that power is multidimensional 
(Lukes, 1974, Gaventa, 1982), but rarely are these theories explicitly applied to empirical 
studies. While many scholars have recognized the existence of distinct dimensions of power and 
empowerment (Gaventa 2006; Kabeer, 1999; Narayan, 2005; ), I draw primarily here on 
Friedman’s (1992) understanding of various types of power, which was expressly developed for 
application to the pursuit of empowerment in international development and which lends itself 
well to potential measurement.  
Friedman asserts that power has social, political and psychological dimensions. Social 
power is defined as access to various tangible and intangible resources, including information, 
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knowledge and skills, social networks and social organization, and material and economic 
resources. These can perhaps be thought of as human/knowledge capital, social capital and 
economic/material capital. Political power is defined as access to decision-making spaces, and 
psychological power is defined as “an individual sense of potency” (Friedman, 1992).  
A lack of any one of these dimensions of power could theoretically inhibit one’s ability to 
direct one’s own life. For example, political power without social power could mean that one has 
formal access to decision-making spaces, but lacks the resources to be influential within them. 
Social power in the absence of psychological power could mean that one fails to recognize the 
resources available and is therefore incapable of making use of them (Diener & Biswas-Diener, 
2005). Psychological power without political power could mean that one feels capable of making 
positive change but is prevented from doing so. However, it is also possible that an increase in 
one dimension of empowerment could have implications for others. For example, an increase in 
social power (perhaps through gaining more education) could improve one’s psychological 
power and lead one to demand greater political power. 
These potential interactions across dimensions of power remain under-studied. Often, 
studies of empowerment focus on a particular dimension of empowerment and, if they examine 
effects on other dimensions, do so only implicitly. Economic resources are the most commonly 
studied aspect of power, and psychological dimensions of power are particularly understudied in 
the empirical literature (Narayan, 2005). 
Levels of Governance 
In addition, scholars have observed that power can be exercised at multiple levels 
(Gaventa, 2006; Narayan, 2005), and thus empowerment can also take place across scales. In 
the context of international development, I liken these to different levels of governance or units 
of decision-making. These levels of governance are nested within each other, further 
complicating matters. For example, consider the case of political power (access to decision-
making spaces). In some societies, women lack the ability to make decisions even within their 
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home. While men typically enjoy this ability, they may still lack access to collective decision-
making spaces at the community level. Even those who do have this access, however, may lack 
power if those community-level decision-making spaces themselves are relatively impotent with 
respect to broader governance structures. Similarly, with respect to social power, the resources 
that an individual has access to within their household is constrained by the resources held by 
that household, which is in turn constrained by the resources available in the wider context of its 
community, county and national government.  
The various dimensions of power can be exercised across different levels of governance, 
but they are conceived of here from the perspective of an individual embedded within those 
levels (not as characteristics of the levels themselves). For example, political and psychological 
power refer, respectively, to an individual’s access to and beliefs about each of the three levels. 
Social power (access to resources), while conceived at the individual level, is constrained by the 
availability of those resources within the context in which an individual lives. For the purpose of 
measurability, however, it may be sufficient to consider total resources available to an 
individual. Table 1 depicts Friedman’s three dimensions of power, exercised across three 
commonly studied levels of governance (though depending on the context, there may be more).  
Table 3.1: Dimensions of Power across Levels of Governance 
Levels of Governance/ 
Dimensions of Power  Household Level Community Level 
County/Government 
Level 
Psychological 
Power: 
Beliefs in Abilities 
 
Individual’s belief in 
their own abilities 
(Self-Efficacy) 
 
Individuals’ beliefs in 
their capacity to work 
together as a group 
(Collective Efficacy) 
 
Individuals’ beliefs in 
their capacity to 
influence government 
(Political Efficacy) 
Social Power: 
Access to 
Resources 
Access to Human, 
Social & Financial 
Capital within the 
household 
Access to Human, 
Social & Financial 
Capital within the 
community 
Access to Human, 
Social & Financial 
Capital at the 
Government Level 
Political Power: 
Access to Decision 
Spaces 
Access to Influence in 
Intra-household 
decision-making  
Access to Influence in 
community decision-
making 
Access to Influence in 
government decision-
making 
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Observable Outcomes of Empowerment 
While power as a primary concept involves access to resources that confer ability to 
make direct one’s own life, access and ability are very difficult to measure unless they are 
actually used. Thus in applying this framework to an empirical setting, as will be done in the 
remainder of this paper, I approximate the cells in this matrix with measurable indicators. 
Rather than access to resources, researchers may measure the degree to which individuals 
actually have the resources in question. For example, trust is an appropriate aggregate measure 
of social capital, because social capital, when effectively used, results in trust among individuals 
(Dasgupta, 2011; Morrone et al., 2009). Rather than access to decision-making spaces, actual 
participation in these spaces may be observed. For example, participation in government 
decision-making may take the form of voting, lobbying or directly petitioning the government 
for services. Rather than overall ability to affect change (presumably the cumulative effect of all 
cells in this matrix being filled), researchers may measure observable actions taken at each level 
that result in such change.  
Friedman’s characterization of different sources of power overlaps somewhat with 
Kabeer’s depiction of inter-related dimensions of empowerment, which includes “resources” 
(similar to Friedman’s “social power”), “agency” (which Kabeer defines as processes of decision-
making, related to Friedman’s “political power”) and “achievements (well-being outcomes)” 
(1999). This last is an important addition to the framework, because actions taken in pursuit of 
increased well-being are more observable and conclusive than individual forms of power. 
Although I adopt the capabilities approach, which views empowerment as increasing the 
ability to direct one’s life whether or not any visible change occurs as a result, I also assume that 
in a context of extreme poverty, at least some actions will be taken as a result of empowerment. 
While empowerment may hold value whether exercised or not, observation of it being put to use 
is the only certain way to empirically demonstrate that it exists. Table 2 presents a slightly 
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altered version of the framework above, which refers to measurable indicators, rather than 
dimensions of power itself. 
If the different dimensions of power are successfully engaged, they should result in 
enhanced capabilities of people to improve their lives and better prepare for and react to crisis, 
at each of the three levels of governance. If people actually use these enhanced capabilities, they 
should be observable as:  
• Individual or family action to create private goods for the benefit of the household 
• Community action (Collective action by groups) to create public goods for the benefit of 
the community 
• Government action, in which individuals, groups or the community as a whole demand 
public goods and services through the government itself 
Table 3.2: Measurable Indicators of Power Across Scales of Governance 
Levels of 
Governance/ 
Dimensions of Power  
Household Level Community Level County/Government Level 
Psychological 
Power Self-Efficacy Collective Efficacy Political Efficacy 
Social Power 
Human Capital 
Social Capital 
Financial Capital 
Community access to 
Human, Social & 
Financial Capital 
Availability of Human, 
Social & Financial 
Capital at the 
Government Level 
Political Power 
Participation in 
household decision-
making  
Participation in 
community decision-
making 
Participation in 
government decision-
making 
Observable 
Outcomes of 
Empowerment 
Individual/Household 
Actions Taken & 
Resulting Change 
Collective Action 
Taken & Resulting 
Change 
Action Taken through 
the Government & 
Resulting Change 
 
Relative vs. Absolute Power 
Finally, power has both an absolute component and a relational or relative one. With 
respect to each square in the matrix, empowerment may be concerned both with an individual’s 
own access to these sources of power, but also how that access compares to others at each level 
of governance. Thus each cell should theoretically be concerned with both absolute levels and 
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also inequality across groups. For example, if women’s access to decision-making spaces in the 
community increases, but men’s influence simultaneously increases by even more, then on net 
women’s ability to shape their own lives may have actually decreased. On the other hand, if 
household incomes rise significantly, women’s access to financial capital may increase without 
any change in their access relative to men. Greater access to funds in absolute terms may very 
well improve women’s abilities to meet their own goals, despite a lack of change in relative 
terms. Similarly, greater coordination and cooperation across community members may 
increase social capital for everyone in absolute but not relative terms, and yet this could 
certainly enhance capabilities for all those involved. The importance of absolute vs relative 
measures of power likely depends on the degree of scarcity and competition over a particular 
resource at a given level of governance, and if that resource is intrinsically rivalrous or not.  
One implication of the partially relative nature of power is that an intervention itself 
might usefully engage with both the disempowered group it targets as well as other actors who 
are relatively powerful. Another implication is that it is generally advisable in studies of 
empowerment to survey both the marginalized group whose power is intended to increase and 
those who initially wield greater power. In practice, it may be possible to directly compare 
relative levels of resources and participation in decision-making spaces, but in at least some 
cases (psychological power stands out in this regard) direct comparisons across individuals may 
not be feasible. Partly for this reason, it is important to consider not only indicators of power 
itself but also observations of its use in practice, as identified in the bottom row of Table 3.2.  
While dimensions of power and levels of governance over which it can be employed have 
been discussed in the past, few empirical interventions take a comprehensive approach, 
attempting to influence and measure various dimensions of empowerment simultaneously. Most 
empirical studies that address this have focused on the relationship between social power 
(specifically with respect to business training) and political power (specifically with respect to 
participation in the government) for women. The failure of these studies to demonstrate that 
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one dimension reliably produces changes on the other implies that more comprehensive 
approaches are necessary. The next section of this paper describes an intervention in northern 
Kenya which combined various components of previously studied programs in an effort to 
address multiple dimensions of power in a single context.  
 
3.4 Context and Intervention: Women’s Empowerment in Northern Kenya 
I conducted this research in partnership with an NGO2 working in Marsabit County, 
Kenya. This NGO had previously supported pastoralist women in northern Kenya with grants 
and training to begin small businesses. In the wake of constitutional reform and related donor 
trends, it recently received funding to begin a political empowerment program to complement 
its existing business training program for women. I advised the NGO on the design and 
monitoring of this new program (called “the Governance Program”), but final decisions with 
respect to both the program design and survey structure were made by NGO staff with 
consideration of donor requirements, logistical concerns and complementarities with their pre-
existing program. Below I describe the geographical context (Marsabit County), the institutional 
background (reforms related to Kenya’s newly implemented constitution), the design of the 
intervention itself (the Governance Program) and the survey tool used to measure its effects.  
 
Marsabit County 
As of the most recent official census (2009), Marsabit County had a poverty rate of 
83.2%, making it the fourth poorest of Kenya’s 47 counties. Access to physical infrastructure was 
similarly deficient with only 7.5% of households in Marsabit having access to electricity and only 
35.4% with access to improved sanitation (compared with 87.8% nationally). In terms of human 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2!The NGO name is withheld here, in keeping with the wishes of the NGO, in order to protect the anonymity of the 
research subjects.  
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capital, Marsabit ranked 44th out of 47 counties on literacy and 42nd on school attainment. 
Among the female beneficiaries of my partner NGO, the vast majority are illiterate. 
In addition, Marsabit is comprised primarily of pastoralist populations with much 
household income dependent on livestock and thus particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in 
time of drought. While traditionally pastoralist institutions were actually among the most 
resilient social-ecological systems in East Africa (Mwangi & Ostrom, 2009), a combination of 
increased drought due to climate change, changes in land tenure that restrict traditional 
mobility, and exclusion from government services has increasingly threatened nomadic 
pastoralism and brought into question its continued viability.  
Pastoralist communities in northern Kenya continue to be extremely patriarchal in 
nature, and are faced with extreme poverty and uncertainty in the face of persistent drought. 
Women in this context are particularly vulnerable to drought and other disasters. Traditional 
gender roles mean that women are often tasked with household water collection and childcare. 
A further implication of the traditional division of labor is that pastoralist men are highly mobile 
together with their livestock, while women often remain in semi-settled communities, where 
they are less resilient to drought. 
Despite being most affected, women also tend to be less influential in household 
decision-making that might affect their ability to withstand drought. There is substantial 
support for the notion that both negative impacts of drought and access to elements of adaptive 
capacity are unequally distributed across genders (Cutter, 1995; Denton, 2002; Enarson, 2002). 
Cultural norms within these communities leave women with very limited decision-making 
power within the household, as well as very low levels of education. While we lack hard data at 
the county level, we do know that across my NGO partner’s beneficiaries, at least 30% of women 
report having no influence whatsoever over household decisions such as purchasing food, 
children’s medical bills and school fees, and this figure is as high as 90% in some communities.  
66 
!
Prior to providing guidance on the design of the Governance Program, I organized five 
focus groups in each of four regions within Marsabit County. Within each region, focus groups 
took place in both the central (slightly more densely populated) community and in one of the 
more isolated, rural satellite communities. In each location, the NGO provided a facilitator with 
knowledge of the local native language to conduct one focus group with prior participants in the 
NGO’s business training program, and one focus group with women who meet the eligibility 
requirements but had not yet participated in the program. 
Focus group participants indicated that they have little influence within the household, 
with their husband making most decisions without consulting them. There were also several 
references to domestic violence. These discussions also indicated that knowledge of the new 
constitution and the rights and responsibilities conferred to citizens is limited. While 
participants cited the constitution as bringing positive change in areas such as “gender equality” 
and “peace,” very few details were known about what specific provisions the constitution 
provides to accomplish these goals. When particulars were given, they were often based upon 
misinformation. Several focus groups cited female genital mutilation, which is not actually 
referenced anywhere in the constitution. Awareness of specific governance structures and 
political opportunities available to women was very low across all focus groups. 
Focus group discussions combined with general conditions of poverty and 
marginalization across Marsabit County suggest that women in this context likely face barriers 
on all measurable dimensions of empowerment, making this an ideal “hard case” location to 
study improvements on different dimensions. 
 
Women’s Status and Local Governance in Kenya 
Kenya’s new constitution, ratified by popular vote in 2010, mandates the use of public 
participation in virtually every area of governance, as well as the creation of semi-autonomous 
county governments, who are subject to those participation requirements. It also includes 
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several special provisions for women, such as a mandate that no more than two-thirds of a 
county executive committee be of the same gender.  
However, at the time of this research, constitutional mandates were still in the process of 
being implemented, and provisions regarding public participation were left largely open to 
interpretation by individual county governments. In Marsabit County, where this study takes 
place, the existence of a large NGO and civil society sector was able to influence this 
interpretation and convince the county government to adopt a community development process 
called “Community Conversations” (CC) as their formal method of participatory planning. CC is 
a process developed by Concern, an international NGO, which they have adopted as their 
standard approach to development throughout the world.  
CC is a participatory process meant to engage the entire community in making decisions 
regarding its own development, and at the time of this study, the Marsabit County government 
had agreed to recognize the decision outcomes of this process as its formal method of receiving 
citizen input into their budgeting process, as required by the new constitution. While Concern 
designed and advocated for the adoption of CC, it typically engages with local NGO partners as 
implementing agencies. Taking advantage of the formal recognition of CC on the part of the 
county government, my NGO partner agreed to act as a CC implementing agency, provided that 
it could combine that process with additional components meant specifically to empower 
women to take advantage of these new spaces for decision-making. 
 
Intervention: The Governance Program 
The Governance Program involved a cocktail of interventions that the implementing 
NGO believed would, in combination, result in women’s empowerment, particularly with respect 
to political dimensions of power (access to and influence over decision-making spaces). It aimed 
to do so both by creating new community-level spaces for decision-making (through the 
introduction of CC’s development committees) and by increasing the social power (in this case, 
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available knowledge and skills) of women in each community. This latter was addressed through 
the provision of civic education courses for the entire community and leadership and 
communication training for women specifically. In addition, the NGO sought to enhance its 
previous business training programs for women by engaging directly with men in seminars 
meant to educate them about the importance of the programming for women and the benefits it 
could provide to the community as a whole. These seminars focused on the usefulness of 
women’s businesses for resource diversification and enhanced ability to withstand drought.  
The NGO included these additional components (civic education, leadership and 
communication training for women, and educational seminars for men) based on a combination 
of direct recommendations from women in the previously mentioned focus groups, as well as 
advice from me based on academic literature about the success of previous women’s 
empowerment programs.  
Civic education was included because the focus groups had revealed substantial 
misinformation about the new governance structures. However, we also acknowledged that in a 
prior study (Gottlieb, 2014) civic education in absence of other gender-specific efforts actually 
exacerbated inequalities. We hoped that the nature of CC, which explicitly involves both men 
and women in its development committees, would help to allay those fears. In addition, the 
NGO added a women’s training component that was intended to help better prepare women to 
take advantage of these new decision-making spaces. This was conducted through pre-existing 
women’s groups formed during the previous business training program. 
In addition, the NGO decided to include a workshop directed specifically at men in the 
community. This was done for three reasons. First, beneficiaries of the previous business 
training program reported in focus group discussions that while they had learned a lot about the 
importance of business diversification in their training programs, their husbands still lacked this 
knowledge and continued to serve as an obstacle to their business expansion. They specifically 
requested the addition of trainings for men. Second, the introduction of new community-level 
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decision-making spaces in a prior study (Beath et al., 2013) had successfully engaged women’s 
participation but failed to have an impact on household-level decision-making. Perhaps the 
men’s workshop could be used to change perceptions of women’s roles in the households. 
Finally, the relational aspect of power discussed in the previous section above implies that 
increasing the power of a marginalized group may not even be possible without also addressing 
potential interference from those who benefit from the status quo.   
Table 3 outlines each component of this intervention and its context with closely related 
previous studies. It was hoped that by combining elements of prior interventions and 
incorporating additional components that address their shortcomings (as described in the 
previous literature), this intervention could generate improvements in several dimensions of 
power. While each component was intended to have a direct effect on some specific dimensions 
of power, the combination could also theoretically have spillovers on other aspects of power in 
the long run. 
Table 3.3: Elements of the Intervention & Hypothesized Effects on Dimensions of Power 
 
Elements of Intervention 
(Treatment Group Only) 
Direct Effects on Dimensions 
of Women’s Power 
Long-Term Effects in 
Combination 
Civic Education for Men & Women, 
Leadership & Communication 
Training for Women only 
Social Power: Human Capital 
Psychological Power: Self- & 
Political Efficacy 
 
Political Power: Increased 
Access, Participation and 
Influence over Decision-
Making across all three 
Levels of Governance 
& 
Resultant Observable Actions 
Taken to Improve Quality of 
Life 
Community Development Councils 
with Men & Women 
Political Power: Access to 
Community-Level Decision-
Making Spaces 
Seminars directed at Men 
Specifically 
Political Power: Access to 
Household-Level Decision-Making 
through consideration of  
power as relational 
Contextual Factors 
(Both Treatment & Control 
Group) 
 
Pre-Existing Business Training for 
Women 
Social Power: Financial Capital 
Psychological Power: Self- & 
Political Efficacy 
New County-Level Government 
Structures with Quotas for Women  
Political Power: Access to 
Government-Level Decision-
making Spaces 
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The Survey Instrument 
In keeping with both the goals of the donor agency and the high risk of severe drought in 
this region, the NGO designed the survey instrument based on frameworks related to disaster 
resilience, understood as the capacity to withstand environmental change. Luckily, both 
scholarly work (Norris et al., 2008; Robinson & Berkes, 2011) and leading practitioner 
frameworks on disaster resilience share many similarities with the conceptualization of power 
outlined earlier in this paper.  
DfiD’s “Approach Paper on Disaster Resilience” explicitly identifies five types (Political, 
Social/Human, Technological/Physical, Financial/Economic and Environmental/Natural) as 
well as four levels (Global/regional, National, Municipal/Local and Community/Household) of 
resilience-building activities. As a result, the NGO’s survey instrument is an imperfect but useful 
tool for measuring changes in dimensions of power. For example, psychological power is 
assessed through three sets of survey questions related to self-, collective and political efficacy. 
Political power is assessed through a series of questions about actual participation in decision-
making at each of the three levels of governance.  
Social Power is understood as access to Human, Social and Financial Capital. Because 
the survey was conducted at the individual level, it included questions on an individuals’ general 
access to each category of resources, but not necessarily their availability at the community or 
government level specifically. Human capital is proxied by political knowledge and awareness. 
Regarding financial capital, the survey included a question about household income. With 
respect to social capital, the survey included a series of questions regarding trust in various 
groups and institutions at each level of governance. 
Finally, the “observable outcomes of empowerment” identified in Table 3.2 are 
represented by a series of questions about whether or not the respondent had taken any action 
to “better prepare for emergency or improve their quality of life.” (See Appendix 3.1 for full text 
of survey questions used in forthcoming regression analyses to represent each dimension.) 
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3.5 Methodology 
This study examines a pilot of the Governance Program described above using a quasi-
experimental approach. The NGO selected eight of its beneficiary communities (villages where 
the women’s financial empowerment program had already been offered), and assigned four to 
the treatment group (where the intervention would be implemented) and four to a control group 
(where only the surveys would be conducted, but where the NGO planned to eventually 
implement the intervention, beyond the pilot period). Selection of the eight communities was 
not random, but rather selected to represent the range of beneficiary communities served by the 
NGO. Selection also avoided the communities previously visited for focus group discussions, so 
as to avoid bias in the results. Assignment to treatment and control groups was similarly 
conducted in a way that attempted to balance the two groups based on size and general location 
within Marsabit County. One of the control villages was unfortunately dropped because 
logistical complications made it not possible for the NGO to access the community during the 
time when baseline surveys were conducted in the other seven locations. 
In all seven remaining locations, the NGO conducted a baseline survey in May 2014 and 
included 358 respondents (264 women) selected through a random walk methodology in each of 
the treatment and control communities. After the implementation of the intervention, the NGO 
conducted a follow-up survey in January 2015, which was intended to include the same 
individuals from the baseline survey. However, some respondents could not be re-located for the 
follow-up survey, and these participants were dropped from the analysis. The follow-up survey 
included 281 respondents (230 women). The main predictor of survey attrition was maleness, 
likely due to the nomadic habits of men in the region. Since our outcomes of interest relate to 
women specifically and the difficulties of surveying men would introduce bias into the results, 
the regression analysis was conducted on the subsample of women only. 
The initial and follow-up surveys ask the same questions of the same women. The 34 
women who could not be located for repeat questioning at endline were dropped from the 
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analysis. A balance test confirms that they do not differ from other women in the survey in a 
significant way that should affect interpretation of the results (See Appendix 3.2). 
Because selection was not truly randomized, I employ a difference-in-difference analysis, 
which compares only the change in outcomes between the treatment and control group, rather 
than absolute measures at endline. Simply comparing a treatment and control group is 
problematic because differences between them may predate the intervention in question. 
Similarly, comparisons of the treatment group alone, before and after the intervention, is 
problematic because other changes may have occurred in the region over the same time period 
and could actually be driving the results. The difference-in-difference methodology avoids these 
two problems, but makes an assumption that any changes in outcomes over time would have 
followed the same trend in absence of the intervention (Angrist & Pischke, 2008).  
Each hypothesized category of effects (the dimensions of power from the conceptual 
framework section) was regressed on a binary variable indicating whether the observation was 
from the treatment or control group, another binary variable indicating whether the observation 
was from before or after the intervention, and an interaction term between the two. This 
interaction term is the estimated effect of the intervention because it is the combined effect of 
being in the treatment group and being surveyed after the intervention occurred (Puhani, 2012).  
The regressions follow an intent-to-treat analysis and thus may underestimate impact of 
the program, because the survey includes those in the treatment group who did not in fact 
participate directly in the program. This is the preferred approach for two reasons. First, if very 
few people select into a program then it may be inadvisable from a policy standpoint even if the 
few people who participated did benefit. Second, the difference-in-difference design requires 
that the treatment and control groups be comparable. Comparing the entire control group only 
to those who participate in the program would bias the results, since we cannot identify the 
people in the control group who counterfactually would have participated given the opportunity. 
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Regressions also include common demographic controls, related to age, gender, education 
(literacy, in this case) and household income, and make use of robust, clustered standard errors.  
The regression results below include a mix of linear, logit and ordered logit regressions, 
depending on whether the outcome in question was continuous, binary or categorical.  
 
3.6 Findings 
In keeping with the conceptual framework described earlier, I use regression analysis to 
examine the impact of the intervention on various dimensions of power: psychological (does one 
believe oneself to be capable of action?), material/economic and social (does one have the 
necessary resources for action?), and political (can one access relevant decision spaces?).  
As discussed earlier, the dimensions of power described in Table 3.1 are not easily 
measurable. Table 3.2 describes the more directly measurable outcomes or counterparts to the 
dimensions of power described in Table 3.1. An individual’s access to knowledge (an aspect of 
human capital) is best assessed through actual knowledge, for example. In addition, the most 
theoretically precise measurable indicators of power in Table 2 are not always available in 
practice, so proxies are used based on what was available in the survey used by the NGO.  
Thus, I analyze psychological power using survey questions about self-, collective and 
political efficacy. Social power (access to resources) is measured through income (financial 
capital), trust (social capital) and political knowledge (human capital). Political power (access to 
decision-making spaces) is measured through actual participation in decision-making spaces 
within the household, community and government. (See Appendix 3.1 for a full list of survey 
questions used in each section of the analysis.) 
 
Psychological Power: Beliefs in Abilities (Self-, Collective and Political Efficacy) 
To assess impacts on psychological empowerment, the survey included 5 questions each 
related to self-, collective and political efficacy (Table 3.4). The five questions for each level were 
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then loaded into composite indicators for each level using Principal Components Analysis. The 
intervention had no statistically significant effect on any level of efficacy. In addition, all 
coefficients were negative, except with respect to two of the sub-questions on political efficacy, 
which were related to perceived political knowledge and access to information.  
One possible explanation for the negative coefficients is that increased knowledge of the 
political structures that exist serves only to make people aware of how much they do not know, 
initially decreasing confidence in their abilities to make an impact. This could be related to the 
short time horizon over which the surveys were conducted, and it is possible that once people 
have had time to familiarize themselves with the new governance structures that efficacy will 
improve over the long-run. Taken together with other findings, it may suggest that at least in the 
short-run, encouraging greater political participation, in the absence of tangible results of that 
participation, may have the adverse effect of political disenchantment. 
 
Table 3.4: Psychological Power – Beliefs in Abilities 
 Self-Efficacy Collective Efficacy Political Efficacy 
Treatment -0.727 0.0340 -0.127 
 (1.094) (0.500) (0.279) 
    
Endline 1.350** 1.393** 1.130* 
 (0.256) (0.241) (0.334) 
    
TreatmentEndline -0.296 -0.337 -0.420 
 (0.307) (0.289) (0.420) 
    
Financial Program 0.285 0.197 0.145 
 (0.391) (0.194) (0.201) 
    
Age -0.0147* -0.00840 -0.00316 
 (0.00496) (0.00571) (0.00790) 
    
Literacy -0.0416 -0.405 0.892* 
 (0.481) (0.488) (0.307) 
    
Income -0.000291 -0.0127* 0.00719* 
 (0.00408) (0.00464) (0.00213) 
    
Constant 0.0610 -0.366 -0.580** 
 (0.894) (0.351) (0.143) 
Observations 441 435 442 
Standard errors in parentheses  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 3.5: Human Capital: Political Knowledge & Awareness 
 
 Correct 
Answers on 
Political Quiz 
Wrong Answers 
on Political 
Quiz 
Non-Answers 
on Political 
Quiz 
Awareness of 
female 
politicians 
      
Treatment -0.186 -0.227 0.413 -0.397 
 (0.0946) (0.170) (0.225) (0.749) 
     
Endline 0.154 0.0682 -0.222 -0.395* 
 (0.0786) (0.0518) (0.100) (0.189) 
     
TreatmentEndline 0.479* 0.395*** -0.874*** 0.713** 
 (0.134) (0.0593) (0.131) (0.258) 
     
Financial Program 0.118 0.140 -0.257** 0.476** 
 (0.0639) (0.0921) (0.0575) (0.172) 
     
Age 0.00355 -0.000487 -0.00306 -0.000331 
 (0.00207) (0.00112) (0.00181) (0.0114) 
     
Literacy 1.471* 0.571** -2.041** 0.814** 
 (0.397) (0.153) (0.497) (0.258) 
     
Income 0.00554 0.00204 -0.00758 -0.00666 
 (0.00550) (0.00172) (0.00647) (0.00346) 
     
Constant 0.463** 0.717** 5.821*** 0.253 
 (0.118) (0.167) (0.168) (0.343) 
Observations 443 443 443 439 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Social Power: Access to Resources (Human, Social & Financial Capital) 
There is no statistically significant change in total household income (a measure of 
financial capital) relative to the control group as a result of the Governance Program. This is 
perhaps unsurprising given that the field experiment examines impact of the additional 
Governance Program interventions, not the initial financial empowerment program (which was 
offered in both treatment and control groups prior to the beginning of the Governance 
Program). 
One aspect of human capital directly addressed in the intervention (and thus measured 
on the related survey) was political knowledge and awareness (Table 3.5). The survey also 
included questions about trust in various groups and institutions at each level, which are used 
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here as a proxy for social capital at each level. Note that what is being measured here is an 
individual woman’s access to these various resources, not the sum total of human, financial or 
social capital available within the community or government institutions. 
There was a significant impact on both political knowledge and awareness of female 
politicians, both of which increased as a result of the program. In addition, the results show that 
as a result of the intervention, women are more likely to answer the questions on the politics 
quiz, even if they get the wrong answer. This is interesting in light of prior research that 
demonstrates the gender gaps in tested knowledge (at least in the United States) can be 
explained in large part by men’s greater willingness to guess (Mondak & Anderson, 2004). This 
greater willingness to guess (perhaps related to risk-seeking behavior) also appears to be 
influenced by literacy and having participated previously in the financial empowerment 
program.  
As a rough proxy for social capital and social cohesion, the survey also reports on levels 
of trust in various institutions and groups at each level of governance (Table 3.6). The only 
statistically significant results in this section are that the intervention has had a negative impact 
on trust in the community leader but a positive impact on trust in one’s spouse. While not 
significant, the other coefficients seem consistent with these results: trust related to government 
institutions or community level groups indicate negative results. Meanwhile the results appear 
positive relevant to trust in family, spouse and other women.  
None of the effects with respect to social capital/trust are particularly large in 
magnitude, but they do seem consistent with other results (described in the section below), 
which indicate mixed results at the community and government level, but positive results at the 
household level. 
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Table 3.6: Social C
apital –
 Trust at V
arious Levels 
 
 
H
ow
 m
uch trust do you place in each of the follow
ing? 
 
 
Spouse 
Fam
ily 
Friends 
Com
m
unity 
leader 
Com
m
unity 
m
em
bers 
O
ther 
w
om
en in 
com
m
unity 
County 
governm
ent 
N
ational 
governm
ent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treatm
ent 
-0.148 
-0.338 
0.619 
1.156
*** 
1.040
* 
0.426 
0.0155 
-0.180 
 
(0.321) 
(0.456) 
(0.453) 
(0.288) 
(0.529) 
(0.403) 
(0.225) 
(0.433) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Endline 
0.266 
-0.259 
0.199 
1.487
*** 
1.104
* 
0.432
*** 
2.290
*** 
2.288
*** 
 
(0.335) 
(0.512) 
(0.831) 
(0.311) 
(0.441) 
(0.0752) 
(0.556) 
(0.566) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treatm
ent* 
1.737
*** 
0.743 
-0.570 
-0.886
** 
-0.456 
0.583 
-0.246 
-0.270 
    Endline 
(0.517) 
(0.958) 
(0.869) 
(0.335) 
(0.556) 
(0.485) 
(0.684) 
(0.493) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial 
-0.492 
-0.247 
0.168 
0.149 
0.0857 
0.0886 
0.108 
0.272 
    Program
 
(0.518) 
(0.397) 
(0.219) 
(0.154) 
(0.207) 
(0.190) 
(0.193) 
(0.243) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Age 
0.0229 
0.0220 
0.00460 
0.00539 
0.0143 
0.0107 
0.000118 
-0.000639 
 
(0.0206) 
(0.0181) 
(0.00540) 
(0.00750) 
(0.00804) 
(0.00814) 
(0.00701) 
(0.00687) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Literacy 
-0.599
* 
14.80
*** 
1.016
* 
-0.0369 
0.248 
0.0541 
-0.111 
-0.206 
 
(0.281) 
(0.615) 
(0.402) 
(0.328) 
(0.219) 
(0.541) 
(0.302) 
(0.570) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Incom
e 
0.0283 
-0.00196 
0.00747 
-0.00417 
-0.00325 
0.00763 
0.00661 
0.00565 
 
(0.0358) 
(0.0101) 
(0.00970) 
(0.00416) 
(0.00604) 
(0.0125) 
(0.00433) 
(0.00555) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Constant 
-2.934
** 
-3.143
*** 
-3.289
*** 
-1.153
* 
-1.270
*** 
-2.548
*** 
0.887
** 
1.141 *** 
 
(1.088) 
(0.670) 
(0.641) 
(0.584) 
(0.310) 
(0.631) 
(0.279) 
(0.242) 
O
bservations 
399 
442 
443 
442 
442 
442 
439 
440 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 3.7: W
om
en’s D
ecision
-M
aking P
ow
er in the G
overnm
ent 
  
 
In the past three years, have you: 
 
 
M
ade 
donation of 
tim
e or 
m
oney 
Voted 
Petitioned 
governm
ent 
for 
som
ething  
Participated 
in an 
association  
Contacted 
an 
influential 
person 
Participated 
in an 
inform
ation 
cam
paign  
Protested 
or dem
on-
strated  
Contacted 
your elected 
represent-
ative  
Talked to 
people in 
your area 
about a 
problem
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treatm
ent 
0.406 
-0.581 
1.310 
0.206 
0.391 
-1.285 
-1.345 
-1.103 
-0.839
** 
 
(0.464) 
(0.752) 
(0.910) 
(0.333) 
(0.748) 
(1.607) 
(1.173) 
(0.945) 
(0.279) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Endline 
1.957
* 
-1.457
* 
2.053
*** 
0.727
*** 
3.114
*** 
1.514 
-0.142 
1.063 
0.674 
 
(0.793) 
(0.634) 
(0.480) 
(0.122) 
(0.798) 
(1.037) 
(0.0867) 
(0.635) 
(0.496) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treatm
ent* 
-0.842 
1.381 * 
-1.769
** 
0.00113 
-1.149 
-0.422 
0.158 
0.238 
0.601 
    Endline 
(1.068) 
(0.615) 
(0.554) 
(0.574) 
(1.158) 
(1.348) 
(1.645) 
(1.219) 
(0.591) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial  
-0.304 
0.427 
0.347 
1.834
*** 
0.630 
1.296 
1.057 
0.247 
0.0986 
     Program
 
(0.348) 
(0.442) 
(0.185) 
(0.413) 
(0.696) 
(0.750) 
(0.793) 
(0.702) 
(0.246) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Age 
-0.0164 
0.105
** 
0.0136 
0.0104 
0.0171 
-0.0399 
-0.0361 * 
0.0119 
-0.00332 
 
(0.00877) 
(0.0389) 
(0.00892) 
(0.0142) 
(0.0154) 
(0.0281) 
(0.0163) 
(0.0150) 
(0.00929) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Literacy 
-0.848 
-1.105 
-0.328 
1.054
* 
2.043
*** 
0.607
* 
0.949
* 
1.206
* 
0.0639 
 
(0.517) 
(0.570) 
(1.286) 
(0.443) 
(0.332) 
(0.275) 
(0.387) 
(0.607) 
(0.131) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Incom
e 
0.0300
* 
0.0494 
-0.00933 
-0.0120 
0.0194
* 
-0.000447 
0.0175 
0.00845 
0.00392 
 
(0.0135) 
(0.0359) 
(0.00892) 
(0.0167) 
(0.00811) 
(0.0125) 
(0.00983) 
(0.00655) 
(0.00629) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Constant 
0.168 
-0.327 
-4.529
*** 
-3.462
*** 
-5.986
*** 
-3.048
*** 
-3.163
*** 
-3.682
** 
-0.473 
 
(0.659) 
(0.900) 
(0.449) 
(0.715) 
(0.902) 
(0.523) 
(0.572) 
(1.235) 
(0.501) 
O
bservations 
443 
443 
441 
443 
443 
443 
443 
442 
443 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Political Power: Access to Decision-Making Spaces 
Decision-Making Power in the Government 
I find few statistically significant effects on a number of measures of women’s 
involvement and influence in formal government structures (Table 3.7). Those that are 
statistically significant should be interpreted cautiously. Women in the treatment group were 
more likely to have voted and less likely to have petitioned the government. There is no 
statistically significant impact with respect to other forms of participation at this level. The 
negative impact on petitioning the government is difficult to interpret. This could reflect distrust 
in the government or political disenchantment. However, it could also reflect a feeling that 
needs are being met through other means. On the whole, there simply weren’t large effects on 
political participation at the level of the government, though of course this may change once the 
new political structures have been in place for a longer period of time.   
 
Decision-Making Power in the Community 
After the intervention, women in the treatment group are more likely to say that they 
have attended a meeting where village decisions were made (Table 3.8). This indicates at least 
that the Community Conversations methodology was more successful than previous iterations at 
giving women physical access to decision-making spaces and/or convincing them to attend. 
However, they are not any more likely to have actually spoken at the meeting.  
An additional question, regarding whether the women “felt that others listened to you” 
during the meeting was dropped from the regression analysis because all but one of those 
women who said they had spoken also said that they felt heard. However, women in the 
treatment group also rate the attention paid to them by local leaders lower relative to the control 
group.  
 
 
!80 
!
Table 3.8: Women’s Decision-Making Power in the Community 
 Ever attended 
session where 
villagers gather to 
make a decision 
Ever spoken at this 
meeting 
Level of attention you 
feel local leaders pay to 
what people think 
before deciding 
     
Treatment 0.156 0.498 -0.512 
 (0.379) (0.698) (0.434) 
    
Endline -0.0944 0.136 -0.0681 
 (0.298) (0.235) (0.382) 
    
TreatmentEndline 1.574*** -0.126 -0.947* 
 (0.317) (0.374) (0.483) 
    
Financial Program 0.422 0.194 -0.0358 
 (0.293) (0.445) (0.226) 
    
Age 0.0126 0.0257* -0.00421 
 (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.00729) 
    
Literacy 0.923*** 1.249 0.304 
 (0.125) (0.883) (0.232) 
    
Income 0.0111 0.0268** 0.00545 
 (0.00691) (0.00949) (0.00361) 
    
Constant -1.938*** -3.611***  
 (0.477) (0.850)  
Observations 443 442 378 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Decision-Making Power in the Household 
The survey also included a series of questions related to household decision-making 
(Table 3.9). The data reported in Table 3.9 were in response to questions about “who has the 
final say” in decision-making related to each category. Thus they are a particularly hard test of 
women’s influence, since even where men reportedly have the final say, women may have some 
degree of soft influence over the decision. 
I find that this intervention did lead to changes in household decision-making power for 
women in at least two categories of decisions: food purchases and school fee payments. The 
coefficients for other categories are positive, but not significant, except with respect to medical 
expenses, where the coefficient is negative but not significant.  
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Table 3.9: Women’s Decision-Making Power in the Household 
  
Degree of Women’s Influence Over Decisions Related to: 
 
 Children’s 
Schooling 
Food 
Purchases 
Household 
Items 
Livestock Medical 
Expenses 
School Fees 
Treatment 0.251 -0.0690 -0.823* 0.459* 0.552* 0.221 
 (0.238) (0.223) (0.338) (0.203) (0.271) (0.166) 
       
Endline 0.277 -0.687*** -0.235 -0.101 -0.214 -0.327*** 
 (0.270) (0.144) (0.735) (0.165) (0.247) (0.0720) 
       
Treatment* 0.486 0.534* 0.323 0.116 -0.271 0.325** 
  Endline (0.362) (0.264) (0.857) (0.197) (0.401) (0.121) 
       
Financial    0.0777 0.0905 0.201 0.150 0.218 0.287 
  Program (0.249) (0.246) (0.294) (0.217) (0.357) (0.272) 
       
Age 0.0265* 0.0267* 0.00186 0.0297* 0.0302* 0.0247 
 (0.0124) (0.0104) (0.0101) (0.0143) (0.0131) (0.0143) 
       
Literacy 0.529 -0.550 0.621 0.170 -0.229 -0.129 
 (0.317) (0.457) (0.687) (0.192) (0.293) (0.375) 
       
Income 0.00984* 0.00294 0.00227 -0.0165 0.00522 0.00473 
 (0.00476) (0.00836) (0.0101) (0.0121) (0.00745) (0.00802) 
       
Constant 1.335*** 1.569*** -1.059* 2.605*** 2.472*** 2.472*** 
 (0.339) (0.347) (0.516) (0.502) (0.573) (0.484) 
Observations 418 442 439 371 429 408 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Observable Outcomes of Empowerment 
While the questions above assess women’s perceptions of their access to decision-making 
spaces and ability to influence decisions, the survey also asked for examples of actual actions 
taken at each level of influence (Table 3.10). Theoretically, a person can be ‘empowered’ to take 
actions and still decide not to take them. However, given imperfect measures of specific 
dimensions of power and the fact that actions are inherently more observable than capacities, an 
empirical approach requires some attention be paid to actual uses of power. 
I find that women in the treatment group are more likely after the intervention to say 
that they had taken action in the household to better prepare for emergency or improve their 
quality of life. When asked what these actions comprised, the vast majority replied that they had 
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“sold livestock.” The effect on political action is positive but not statistically significant, but 
when political action is taken, women are likely to report that it was unsuccessful (and this is 
statistically significant).  
Table 3.10: Observable Actions 
  
Actions to better prepare for emergency or improve quality of life, within the past year: 
 
 Taken 
action in 
Household? 
Were any 
successful? 
Take action 
with the 
community? 
Were any 
successful? 
Action 
within the 
government? 
Were any 
successful? 
        
Treatment -1.352 -2.422* 0.584 0.000 -0.173 -1.392 
 (0.739) (1.099) (0.633) (.) (0.550) (0.892) 
       
Endline 0.749*** 0.498 0.959*** 0.795 -0.111 2.548*** 
 (0.197) (1.466) (0.201) (1.541) (0.300) (0.368) 
       
Treatment* 1.734** 2.128 -0.0887 0.000 0.148 -1.276* 
    Endline (0.528) (1.912) (0.399) (.) (0.347) (0.573) 
       
Financial  0.685* 0.466 0.359 -0.420 0.549** 0.646 
    Program (0.343) (0.807) (0.444) (0.423) (0.169) (0.390) 
       
Age -0.000605 -0.00787 0.00558 0.0109 -0.00220 -0.00564 
 (0.0117) (0.0481) (0.0119) (0.0264) (0.0101) (0.0218) 
       
Literacy 0.396 0 -0.167 0.000 0.364 -0.252 
 (0.474) (.) (0.799) (.) (0.403) (0.428) 
       
Income -0.000989 -0.00435 -0.0182 0.0463 -0.0109 0.00436 
 (0.00868) (0.0387) (0.0122) (0.0773) (0.0115) (0.00832) 
       
Constant -1.587*** 2.999 -2.755*** -0.264 -0.847 -0.144 
 (0.445) (2.609) (0.515) (2.007) (0.481) (1.188) 
Observations 413 112 385 39 400 185 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
This helps explain the negative coefficients on political efficacy, how much attention 
local leaders pay, and even intentions of petitioning the government. If the intervention 
encouraged women to engage in political action, but this action has yet to yield any results, an 
initial negative effect on perceptions of politics is logical. However, being a participant in the 
financial empowerment program is associated with a greater likelihood of having engaged in 
political action. In addition, the coefficient on participation in the financial empowerment 
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program is positive for the question about whether any political action taken was in fact 
successful.  
While I cannot directly assess interactions between previous participation in the 
financial empowerment program and the newly implemented governance program, the positive 
effect of prior participation on successful political action offers some preliminary evidence that, 
although one does not automatically result in the other, there are complementarities between 
improvements in social and political power. 
 
3.7 Discussion 
To summarize the results from the previous section, there were no significant effects of 
the intervention on the psychological dimensions of power for women, as measured by the 
survey. With respect to social power, there was no effect on financial capital, a positive effect on 
human capital (as measured by political knowledge) and mixed results with respect to social 
capital. Human capital did increase as a result of the intervention, but only knowledge with 
respect to government-level structures was measured. Social capital, proxied here by self-
reported trust in various institutions, increased at the household level (trust in one’s husband), 
but decreased at the community level (trust in the community leader). 
Political power (participation and influence in decision-making spaces) increased at the 
household level, but results were mixed at the level of the community and the government. 
Women were more likely to have attended community decision-making meetings (increased 
access) but less likely to report that community leaders paid attention to their concerns 
(decreased influence). They report being more likely to vote but less likely to directly petition the 
government for support – indicating increased participation in some regards but decreased 
participation in others.  
In the category of observable actions taken as a result of empowerment, women were 
more likely to say that action had been taken at the household level. They were no more likely to 
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say that action had been taken at the community or government level, but if action had been 
taken at the government level, they were less likely to report it as successful. Statistically 
significant results and the direction of their influence are summarized in Table 3.11. 
Table 3.11: Summary of Results by Dimensions of Power and Levels of Governance 
Levels of Governance/ 
Dimensions of Power  Household Level Community Level 
County/Government 
Level 
Psychological 
Power No significant effect No significant effect No significant effect 
Social Power Increased Social Capital (+) 
Decreased Social 
Capital (-) 
Increased Human 
Capital (+)  
Political Power 
Increased 
Participation in HH 
Decision-Making (+) 
Increased 
Participation (+) 
Decreased Perceived 
Influence (-) 
More likely to vote (+) 
Less likely to petition 
the government (-) 
Outcomes of 
Empowerment 
Increased HH Action 
(+) No significant effect 
Decreased success of 
actions taken (-) 
 
Taken as a whole, results are very mixed at the community and government level. At 
both of these higher levels of governance, participation in some form does increase, but more 
intensive involvement and perceived influence in those processes either decreases or is 
unaffected. In contrast, there is substantial evidence that something is changing with respect to 
the internal dynamics of the household. Trust in the spouse increases, women are more likely to 
be involved in at least some household decisions, and the household as a unit is more likely to 
have actual taken action to make change. 
Interestingly, though the intervention was primarily designed to enhance women’s 
influence in community and government decision-making processes, most of the actual results 
are concentrated at the household level. What might explain these results? While this research 
design does not make it possible to distinguish the effects of different components of the 
intervention, results can be compared with previous research to better understand the causal 
mechanisms underlying them.  
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Similar to this study, Gottlieb’s (2014) study introduced civic education training for both 
men and women and found that political knowledge increased as a result. That study, however, 
found that civic engagement (measured at the level of the government) unequivocally decreased 
for women, while increasing for men. My results instead suggest mixed results with respect to 
women’s participation, depending on the form of engagement (voting vs. petitioning) and the 
level of governance (community decision-making for a vs. formal government structures). 
Unfortunately, I could not measure the relative effect on men because of the problems described 
earlier with respect to the survey sampling for men.   
In another study with similar components to this one, Beath et al. (2013) looked at an 
intervention that introduced new community-level decision-making structures in a context of 
extreme patriarchy, and found that women not only do engage in these community councils, but 
that female participants in those councils were more likely to have held a meeting with the 
district government. My results are more mixed at both levels of governance. Like Beath et al., 
women participate more in community-level decisions, but unlike Beath et al., they do not 
engage more with the formal government and do not seem to feel they are having an impact. On 
the other hand, Beath et al. find no effect on influence in intrahousehold decision-making, 
whereas my results indicate a small, but significant impact at that level of governance. 
Table 3.12 outlines the similarities and differences between the three studies with respect 
to both the intervention itself and the effects on dimensions of women’s empowerment. Because 
the other studies did not measure all of the same dimensions of power discussed in this paper, 
the table only includes those outcomes over which the studies used comparable measurements. 
The Governance Program essentially combines the main components of the previous two 
interventions, while also adding a few additional components. The mixed results with respect to 
community and government-level decision making could be quite consistent with an additive 
effect of the results found by each of the two previous studies separately.  
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Table 3.12: Putting the Results in the Context of Related Studies 
 (Beath et al. 2013) 
 (Gottlieb 
2014) 
Governance 
Program  
(Grillos 2015) 
Components of the Intervention  
Creation of new Community 
Decision-Making Fora !  ! 
Civic Education for Men & 
Women  ! ! 
Leadership & Communication 
Training for Women   ! 
Men’s Training   ! 
Implemented through Previous 
Business Training for Women   ! 
Effects on Dimensions of Power  
 Social Power: Human Capital 
  Political Knowledge 
(not measured) Increased  Increased  
Political Power:    
  Participation in Government  
  Decision-Making 
Increased  Decreased  Mixed Results 
  Participation in Community  
  Decision-Making 
Increased  (not measured) Mixed Results 
  Participation in Household    
  Decision-Making 
No effect (not measured) Increased  
 
The results with respect to intra-household dynamics, however, do not appear to be 
explained by either the introduction of new community-level decision-making institutions or the 
provision of civic education alone. In the case of the former, no effect was found, and in the 
latter, it was not measured because the author found no compelling theoretical reason to expect 
a household-level effect. Furthermore, the overarching conclusion of the Gottlieb study was that 
discriminatory gender norms were in fact exacerbated by the intervention, making it seem 
unlikely that gender roles with respect to household decision-making would be overturned as a 
result. 
Other possible explanations for the household-level effects include: (1) The household-
level effects were entirely a result of the additional components of the intervention that differ 
from the other two studies; (2) The combination of the key interventions from the previous two 
studies produces results that differ from the mere aggregation of their separate impacts – in 
other words, there are interaction effects between the different components of the intervention; 
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(3) Contextual differences between the study settings account for different results from similar 
intervention types; (4) Minor differences in actual implementation of similar programming in 
different studies may also explain differences in observed outcomes. Of course, it is possible that 
all four of these explanations play some role in explaining differing results, but some are likely 
more influential than others. 
A qualitative understanding of the study context, combined with some descriptive data, 
suggests that the first explanation above accounts plays some role in explaining the household 
level results, in particular through the addition of the training seminar for men only. When 
questioned about the nature of actions taken at the household level, the majority of those 
surveyed reported that the household-level action involved the sale of livestock to diversify 
income. Income diversification was a strategy directly discussed in the seminars for men. In 
addition, even in the treatment group after the intervention, 75% of women surveyed report that 
men alone have the final say regarding livestock sales in their household. Although women’s 
influence experienced a statistically significant increase in some household-level decisions, 
livestock was not one of those categories. This is consistent with cultural norms across the study 
region, where care of livestock is the activity most strongly associated with men.   
It thus seems likely that after attending the men’s seminar, men in the region were 
persuaded of the need to diversify income by selling some livestock, and the resulting cash 
liquidity may have contributed to women’s increased influence over other household decisions 
related to expenditures. This is also consistent with the finding that women report increased 
trust in their spouses. If reluctance to sell livestock to support women’s businesses was 
previously a point of household-level tension (which was indicated in the pre-intervention focus 
group discussions), then this shift would plausibly result in increased trust between spouses.  
In addition, there is some evidence to suggest that contextual factors, in particular the 
fact that this study was conducted in a context where business training for women had already 
been provided, may also have influenced the outcomes of the study. Apart from the impact of 
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the intervention itself, the variable representing participation in the prior financial 
empowerment programming (which was evenly split across the treatment and control group) 
was significant with respect to several outcomes as well, including: willingness to guess on the 
politics quiz, awareness of female politicians, and taking both individual and public action. This 
might indicate that the presence of this pre-existing programming prepared women to take 
advantage of these new structures – but the additional gains represented in the results of the 
field experiment were available only to those women in the treatment group (those who also had 
access to the Governance Program as described above).  
This discussion of causal mechanisms is still largely speculative. With the given data, it is 
not possible to say for sure which components of the intervention acted on which results in what 
combinations. However, the recognition of competing explanations for these results and the 
inability to definitively distinguish between them signals some important areas for further 
research. 
 
3.8 Areas for Future Research 
The implications of these findings for future areas of research are multiple. First, there is 
a need for more studies looking at a combination of programs, rather than a single dimensional 
approach. In reality, interventions do not occur in a vacuum, even when they are implemented 
as true randomized controlled trials. There have almost always been other programs 
implemented previously which may influence related results, and these prior (and sometimes 
ongoing) experiences can change the outcomes of a given experiment. Acknowledging these 
other influences more explicitly with a deeper qualitative understanding of existing context can 
help to make sense of seemingly conflicting results across settings. 
Findings also suggest further acknowledgement of power as a relational concept. While 
many empowerment programs focus on capacity-building of the sort represented by the social 
and economic rows in the conceptual framework above, an acknowledgment of the political 
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dimensions of power reminds us that it may be necessary to engage with actors apart from those 
we intend to empower. For example, engaging with men may be necessary if we aim to empower 
women. Future research should examine interventions that directly engage men and consider 
the impact of interventions on men and their reactions to them.  
More attention should be paid in general to understudied dimensions of power, such as 
psychological empowerment. Recently there has been a surge of interest in the relationship 
between psychology and poverty (Haushofer, 2014; Haushofer & Fehr, 2014; Mani et al., 2013; 
Mullainathan & Shafir, 2013; Haushofer & Shapiro, 2013). It would be useful to more explicitly 
connect this line of research with the literature on empowerment and gender inequality. 
Finally, experiments should be designed to isolate interactions between different 
dimensions of power. Rather than assessing the impact of a single program (or even a 
combination of programs as was done here), a more sophisticated approach would involve 
multiple treatments with some subjects receiving each program alone and others receiving a 
combination. In this way, we can gain a more nuanced understanding of the ways in which these 
various dimensions relate and interact with each other. 
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Concluding Thoughts 
 
While each of the three studies included in this dissertation addressed a distinct set of 
questions in a specific context, some broader themes relating to the study of participatory 
development emerge across all three.  
First, there is still a need for greater conceptual clarity, not only with respect to the 
various forms that participation can take and the various goals it can be invoked to seek, but also 
regarding various hypothesized effects of and motivations for participation.  
In the first essay, it was necessary to expand an examination of motivations for 
participation to include not only material costs and benefits, but also non-material motivations 
relating to environmental beliefs, and social norms. The nature of these non-material 
motivations and how they can be activated still requires further elucidation. In the second essay, 
I discussed how elite capture is usefully distinguished from elite control and from other forms of 
capture, and I demonstrate that capture can occur at various points within a given participatory 
process. The conceptualization of capture could benefit from still further complexity, 
recognizing the different ways that capture can occur and how certain policy responses may 
target one at the exclusion of others. In the third essay, I attempt to unpack the concept of 
empowerment, recognizing that power operates along multiple dimensions and at different 
levels of governance, and finds expression both within and across individuals.   
Second, my interpretation of results in all three studies suggests the potential relevance 
of the implementing agency and pre-existing social institutions. Participatory processes are not 
created in a vacuum. They are created by an actor or set of actors embedded within a particular 
social structure. The implementing agent very likely has a pre-existing relationship (whether 
through actual interactions or reputational effects) with intended beneficiaries or participants, 
which may influence the answers to all three sets of questions examined in the chapters of this 
dissertation. 
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In the first essay, the existence of strong cultural norms regarding reciprocity in the 
research setting and the fact that the NGO implemented the program through a pre-existing 
participatory process likely played an important role in producing the observed results with 
respect to the decision to participate. In the second essay, the outcomes with respect to poverty 
targeting in the Indonesian government’s program differ from those found in previous studies of 
a similar program run by the World Bank in the same country. Differences may be attributable 
to differing institutional design on the part of the two implementing agencies or to different 
relationships, perceptions or historical experiences with each implementing agency on the part 
of participants in the process. In either case, the implementing agent and the social structure 
within which it is embedded is a relevant factor. In the third essay, the implementing NGO had 
conducted a financial empowerment program previously in these same communities. The 
concentration of effects at the household level may be an additive result of combining the 
previous program with the new Governance Program, or they may be a result of particular 
programming choices made by the NGO in this case, such as the decision to directly engage with 
men. However, the decision to work directly with men was based on feedback from previous 
participants about the limitations of the previous intervention. Thus in either case, the 
implementing agency’s pre-existing relationship with the beneficiary communities played a role 
in producing those effects. 
Third, studies of participatory development could benefit from more direct engagement 
with literature on psychology and behavioral economics. In the introduction, I highlighted the 
role of rational choice and sociological models of human behavior in influencing our 
understanding of the effects of different forms of participation. Lessons from psychological 
understandings of human behavior can help bridge the gap between the two, by recognizing 
effects that are not strictly rational but still potentially measurable. 
In the first essay, Fundación Natura framed their compensation contracts as reciprocal 
agreements in an effort to associate the program with pre-existing reciprocity norms. In the 
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second essay, the conceptual framework on elite capture highlights the potential role of 
deliberation in mitigating self-interested decision-making. Both of these involve psychological 
mechanisms, which do not operate through strictly rational costs and benefits, but unlike more 
nebulous and context-specific sociological factors, they can theoretically be isolated and tested 
in a laboratory setting. In the third essay, I review theoretical literature on power, which 
considers it to have psychological as well as material and social components. This further 
suggests that laboratory experimentation relating specific forms of participation with 
psychological constructs such as efficacy could be very useful. 
Finally, while outside the scope of this dissertation project, the final two sets of questions 
I identified in the introduction remain underexplored. These involve the evolution over time of a 
particular participatory process and more systematic comparisons of participatory processes 
across settings. This suggests the need for both zooming in through detailed study of a single 
research setting over a long period of time, and zooming out through a systematic review of 
existing research on various participatory development initiatives. This review would ideally 
code existing studies according to various aspects of institutional design, characteristics of the 
implementing agent as well as the participants and the relationship between them, features of 
the broader political and cultural context, as well as the observed effects of each study. A meta-
analysis of this sort would allow researchers to identify which, if any, relationships are truly 
generalizable across research settings. 
In making these more holistic assessments of existing and forthcoming studies, several 
points from the introductory remarks are worth restating here. First, the particular institutional 
form taken by a participatory process will depend in part on the understanding of human 
behavior and of the effects of participation held by those in charge of designing it. These 
understandings typically relate to either empowerment justifications (related to effects on 
participants themselves) or effectiveness justifications (related to direct outcomes of the 
process).  
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However, taking a long view of participatory processes, these two sets of outcomes are 
actually just distinct causal pathways meant to arrive at the same long term goal of 
development: enhancing the capacity of individuals and communities to direct their own lives 
(Sen, 1999) – See Figure 4.1. Seen in this way, these different effects have great potential to be 
mutually reinforcing. The direct outcomes of a development program (new infrastructure, for 
example) may leave people more well-equipped to engage in other kinds of beneficial action. 
Meanwhile, empowerment through the participatory process itself may make it easier for people 
to obtain such goods in the future. In addition, the psychological effects I discuss earlier hint at a 
medium-run path in which participation influences the perceived relationship between people 
and these direct outcomes, perhaps changing their behavior in ways that strengthen both. 
Figure 4.1: Theorized Effects of Participatory Development – A Long-Term View 
 
 However, a truly dynamic view of participatory development should acknowledge that 
the figure above reflects only a snapshot of a process that may repeat itself many times in a 
linked chain. As outlined in Figure 4.2, the power, preferences and beliefs of individuals as well 
as the relationships between them are what will influence the participatory institution that is 
adopted in a particular setting. At the same time, an optimistic view suggests that these status 
quo characteristics may still be altered through participation in a given participatory process. 
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Figure 4.2: Understanding Participatory Development as a Dynamic Process Over Time 
 
 
 
 
 
 Much of this potential is evident (though not realized) in the cases discussed in this 
dissertation. In the first essay, a conservation NGO designed the process and their main goal 
was to improve forest conservation. However, by engaging with pre-existing reciprocity norms, 
they hoped to invoke complementary changes in individuals’ perceptions of their relationship 
with the environment and the broader community. If very successful, it is possible to imagine an 
outcome in which these changes even motivate communities to push for corresponding changes 
within the NGO or government processes to match their own commitment to reciprocity. 
 In the second essay, the government introduced a participatory planning process with 
multiple public goals, including increased transparency, legitimacy and poverty alleviation 
through provision of public goods and services. The goals of local leaders within each 
administrative unit may vary and thus explain differing outcomes across the neighborhoods of 
the city. However, as civil society groups (such as the NGO that collected the data I analyze here) 
take an interest in the process, and make efforts to promote effective participation by the poor, it 
is possible for this process to serve as a vehicle for subverting the wishes of wealthy elites, even 
in neighborhoods where they currently dominate the process. 
 In the third essay, despite explicit efforts on the part of the implementing NGO to 
promote women’s engagement with community and governmental decision-making, there is 
little improvement and even some evidence that suggests women are disillusioned by the 
process. Though the new community-level decision-making bodies are designated as formal 
avenues for input to the government, it may be the case that the government itself has little 
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incentive to actually respond to any resultant demands, leading the women to feel that their 
participation is pointless. However, a heightened awareness of their political rights in 
combination with a strengthened partnership at the household level may ultimately lead 
community members to demand greater political accountability over the long run. 
 Despite potential complementarities between differing outcomes, these hopeful results 
remain elusive. They have not yet been fully realized in any of the preceding cases (though they 
still may be in the future), perhaps in part because the choice of institutional form itself is 
subject to the same status quo power relations, material conditions and social structures that 
participation may ideally seek to change. What types of institutions in which contexts can 
achieve such a positive feedback loop remains a question for future work. In my view, the best 
way to approach this question is to engage in a systematic coding of existing studies according to 
specific institutional form, contextual and sectoral setting, and individual and social 
characteristics, preferences and beliefs at different points in time. Perhaps through such an 
endeavor we can finally help to realize the many promised benefits of participatory 
development. 
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Appendix 1.1: Survey Questions Used in Regression Analysis (Translated from Spanish) 
Questions related to Financial Motivations and Costs of Compliance 
How many hectares do you have available in total, including ranch, brush, forest, cloud forest and 
farmland?  
 
How many hectares of forest that you aren’t using?  
 
Do you own this forest? Rent it? Other?   
 
How many hectares of grazing or pastureland do you have available? 
 
How many hectares of cultivated land do you work on, whether your own lands or not?  
 
Do you own your home or rent it?  
 
How many rooms does it have?  
 
Do you own cows?  
 
How many cows do you own in total? 
 
What kinds of other economic activities did you or other members of the household engage in during the 
last year?   
 
Have you or anyone else in your household taken a loan during the last 12 months?  
 
Now I’d like to speak with you about how much trust you have in some organizations. For each one, I’d 
like to know if you always trust, usually trust, sometimes or never trust this kind of organization.  
 
The municipal government? The departmental government? Institutions or NGOs? 
 
Questions related to Social Motivations 
Since which generation has your family lived in this community? 1.Your own generation, 2. Your parents’ 
3. Your grandparents’ 4. Great-grandparents 5. Even earlier 
 
Now I would like to speak about your family’s participation in community organizations. Of the following, 
can you tell me if somebody in your family or you yourself participates, holds an officer’s position 
currently or held a position in the past?  In the OTB? 
 
In how many OTB meetings did you or someone in your household participate in last month? 
 
Have you or someone else in your household done work for the community in the last 12 months?   
 
Can you remember how many times in the last 12 months? 
 
Do you participate in minga, faena or ayni?  
 
Now I will read some statements and I would like to know if you agree with each one. There is no correct 
answer, I just want to know your opinion.  
• Generally, the people in my community cooperate to resolve community problems.  
• The majority of people in my community help me if I need it. 
• If a person works more than others, it’s fair that they earn more money.  
• If a person earns more than others, they must share with the rest.  
 
Do all members of your community contribute equally to the [environmental] problem?  
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Do all members of your community suffer equally from the [environmental] problem? 
 
Questions related to Environmental Motivations 
I’m going to present you with some values that may be taught to children in the home. Of these values, can 
you choose the two that you think are the most important? Independence, Creativity, Protecting the 
Environment, Sharing with Others, Obedience, Being a Good Student, Being Successful 
 
What benefits does your family receive from the forest? Can you name three benefits? 
 
Would you say that the quality or quantity of water is a problem in your community? 
 
Now I will read some statements and I would like to know if you agree with each one. There is no correct 
answer, I just want to know your opinion.  
• In order to improve quality of life, it is necessary to harm the environment. 
• We can have higher economic incomes if we protect the environment. 
• The government should be responsible for imposing laws that tell people what they can do with 
their lands so that they do less harm to the environment.  
• If your neighbors don’t do anything for the environment, then you shouldn’t either. 
 
Do you think that the forest is in better, the same or worse condition compared with how it was five years 
ago? 
 
What can people in your community do to protect the environment? Can you give me three ideas? 
 
OTB-Level Questions 
How many OTB meetings did your community hold in the last month?  
 
Is community work mandatory [through the OTB] in this community?  
 
Do people use minga/faena or ayni when they do work?  
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Appendix 1.2: Determinants of Contract Take-Up, Including Non-Resident Participants 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Age -0.00882  -0.00770 
 (0.106)  (0.173) 
    
Education 0.0472  0.0410 
 (0.059)  (0.114) 
    
Total Land                                 0.00195  0.00167 
 (0.170)  (0.221) 
    
Percent Forested 0.958**  0.807* 
 (0.006)  (0.024) 
    
Percent Pasture Land 0.789**  0.731** 
 (0.002)  (0.005) 
    
Property Ownership 0.854***  0.904*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
    
Obstacles to Access 0.414*  0.396* 
 (0.035)  (0.049) 
    
Number of Rooms                   0.214***  0.195*** 
  In Home (0.000)  (0.000) 
    
Number of Cattle                           0.00827  0.00861 
 (0.102)  (0.087) 
    
Alternative income                     -0.334*  -0.402* 
 (0.041)  (0.016) 
    
Debt                                  0.255  0.204 
 (0.275)  (0.392) 
    
Distrust of 0.00948  0.0523 
  Institutions (0.915)  (0.574) 
    
Environment = Incomes                                     0.00898 -0.0422 
  (0.915) (0.642) 
    
Prioritizes                        0.212 0.127 
  Environment  (0.119) (0.401) 
    
Views Water as Problem  -0.0157 -0.133 
  (0.918) (0.434) 
    
Generations in           0.233*** 0.189* 
  Community  (0.000) (0.011) 
    
OTB Membership                                 0.240** 0.183* 
  (0.002) (0.035) 
    
People Cooperate                                         0.0921* 0.0577 
  (0.048) (0.277) 
    
Constant -1.120 -1.149 -1.774 
 (0.239) (0.126) (0.076) 
Observations 1228 1392 1211 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Appendix 2.1  
 
 
Effect of DPK Grant Spending on Change in RW Poverty Rate 
  
 Change in RW Poverty Rate 2010-2012 
  
Executed Budget to RW -6.65e-09 
  in Year 2011 (4.81e-08) 
  
Constant 7.588 
 (4.049) 
Observations 540 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Appendix 3.1: Survey questions used to proxy dimensions of power 
Psychological Power 
 
Self Efficacy 
How much do you agree with the following statements?  For each question below, choose from: 
Strongly Disagree  -  Disagree  -  Neither Agree nor Disagree  -  Agree  -  Strongly Agree 
• I can solve most problems if I invest the necessary effort. 
• If I am in trouble, I can usually think of a solution. 
• If someone opposes me, I can still find a way to get what I want. 
• It is easy for me to stick to my aims and accomplish my goals. 
• I feel well-prepared to protect my family in cases of drought.  
 
Collective Efficacy 
How much do you agree with the following statements?  For each question below, choose from: 
Strongly Disagree  -  Disagree  -  Neither Agree nor Disagree  -  Agree  -  Strongly Agree 
 
• This community is ineffective compared to other villages at achieving its goals 
• We can resolve crises in the community without any negative aftereffects 
• Our community can present a united vision to outsiders. 
• We can work together to improve conditions in the community. 
• We can persuade the government to provide better services to people in this community. 
 
Political Efficacy 
How much do you agree with the following statements?  For each question below, choose from: 
Strongly Disagree  -  Disagree  -  Neither Agree nor Disagree  -  Agree  -  Strongly Agree 
• I consider myself well qualified to participate in decision-making in the village. 
• I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues in Marsabit County. 
• I feel that I could do as good a job in a leadership position in this village as most other people. 
• I think that I am as well-informed about politics and government as most people. 
• If a public official came to our village to discuss important issues, I would feel confident 
expressing my opinion.  
 
Social Power 
 
Financial Capital  
In the last 30 days, how much has the household earned from: 
• Livestock sale? 
• Meat/fish sale? 
• Hide/skin sale? 
• Milk? 
• Crops? 
• Charcoal? 
• Firewood? 
• Fetching Water? 
• Casual Labor? 
• Employment & Salaried Labor? 
• Tourism activity? 
• Pension? 
• Trading from NGO-sponsored business? 
• Trading from other business? 
[Note: These items summed to create a single household income variable] 
 
 
!109 
!
Human Capital: Political Knowledge 
• True or False: The Constitution states that at least one-third of the County Executive members 
must be women. 
• True or False: The Constitution forbids female genital mutilation.  
• Which level of government is responsible for Police services?  County or National   
• Which level of government is responsible for Pre-Primary Education?  County or National 
• Which branch of government is responsible for Drafting new laws? County Assembly OR County 
Executive 
• What is the Uwezo Fund?  
• Are you aware of any female political leaders in this region?         Yes     No 
• Please name them. 
 
Social Capital: Trust 
How much trust do you place in each of the following? 
      A lot of trust  -  Some trust  -  A little trust  -  No trust   
• Spouse 
• Family 
• Friends 
• Community members 
• Other women in the community 
• Strangers 
• Community Leader 
• County Government 
• National government 
 
Political Power 
 
Decision-making Power in the Household 
In your household, who has the final say with respect to: 
• Buying Food? 
• Children’s Medical Expenses? 
• Sending the children to school? 
• Paying children’s School Fees? 
• Purchasing Livestock? 
• Purchasing Household Items? 
[Responses coded as follows: 1=Men Only  2=Men and Women Together  3=Women Only] 
 
Decision-making Power in the Community 
• Have you ever attended a session where villagers gather to make a decision? 
• Have you ever spoken at this meeting? 
• How much attention do you feel local leaders pay to what people like you think before deciding 
what to do? 
 
Decision-making Power in the Government 
In the last three years, have you personally done any of the following things: 
• Voted        Yes   No 
• Petitioned the government for something   Yes   No 
• Actively participated in an association.    Yes   No 
• Made a personal contact with an influential person.   Yes   No 
• Actively participated in an information campaign.   Yes   No 
• Taken part in a protest march or demonstration.  Yes   No 
• Contacted your elected representative.    Yes   No 
• Talked with other people in your area about a problem.  Yes   No 
• Made a donation of your time or money   Yes   No 
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Observable Actions 
 
Actions Taken at the Household Level 
• In the past year, have you taken any actions in your own household in order to better prepare 
your family for emergencies or to improve your quality of life?     Yes         No         I Don’t Know 
• Have any of these actions been successful?       Yes         No         I Don’t Know 
 
Actions Taken at the Community Level 
• In the past year, have you taken any actions together with others in the community in order to 
better prepare your family for emergencies or to improve your quality of life?   Yes    -   No   -          
I Don’t Know 
• Have any of these actions been successful?       Yes         No         I Don’t Know 
 
Actions Taken at the Government Level 
• In the past year, how often have members of this village gotten together and jointly petitioned 
government officials or political leaders with village development as their goal?               
• Have any of these actions been successful?       Yes         No         I Don’t Know 
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Appendix 3.2: Balance Test Comparing Survey Drop-Outs with Final Study Sample 
  Remained in Survey Could Not Be Relocated 
  mean sd mean sd ttest 
Age 35.13 11.41 33.636 11.360 0.24  
Literacy 0.04 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.10 
Income (KES) 6807.67 18129.30 6118.57 8694.46 0.41 
NGO Business Member 0.52 0.50 0.34 0.48 0.03* 
Treatment Group 0.53 0.50 0.60 0.50 0.22 
Self-Efficacy -0.18 1.65 0.37 1.57 0.04* 
Collective Efficacy -0.08 1.65 0.27 1.47 0.12 
Political Efficacy -0.25 1.24 -0.36 1.19 0.32 
Score on Political Quiz 0.65 0.94 0.66 0.73 0.49 
Household Action 0.14 0.35 0.20 0.41 0.18 
Community Action  0.11 0.32 0.20 0.41 0.09 
HH Decision: Food 1.66 0.91 1.51 0.85 0.19 
HH Decision: School Fees 1.43 0.81 1.41 0.80 0.44 
HH Decision: Livestock 1.43 0.80 1.39 0.80 0.39 
Community Decision: Attended 
Meetings 0.27 0.44 0.31 0.47 0.29 
Community Decision: Leaders Pay Attn 2.87 0.98 2.97 1.14 0.29 
Government Decision: Voted 0.95 0.22 0.86 0.36 0.02* 
Government Decision: Petitioned 0.04 0.21 0.09 0.28 0.15 
  
    
  
Observations  227  35   
 
 
